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Using Learned Helplessness to Understand 
the Effects of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
and Major Depressive Disorder on Refugees 
and Explain Why These Disorders Should 
Qualify as Extraordinary Circumstances 
Excusing Untimely Asylum Applications 
BRANDON R. WHITE† 
INTRODUCTION 
Imagine you are a refugee. For some personal reason 
outside of your control, say your race or religion, you are 
targeted by others and suffer some harm. This harm almost 
certainly involves some level of violence. Perhaps you are 
beaten, raped, or tortured. Maybe you watched your family 
and friends suffer the same, maybe some of these family and 
friends were murdered in front of your eyes. Obviously, going 
to your government for help is pointless. Either your 
government is directly involved or they are completely 
unwilling or unable to protect you. Fleeing is your only real 
option. 
You are able to bring few of your possessions and you 
probably spend most, if not all, of your money escaping. You 
arrive in a new country, are confused by its culture and 
language, and have a tenuous and uncertain legal status. 
You desire a more permanent status, but your first priority 
  
† J.D. Candidate, 2016, SUNY Buffalo Law School; B.S. Biological Sciences: 
Neurobiology & Behavior, 2007, Cornell University. I’d like to thank Professor 
Anjana Malhotra for introducing me to this area of law and pointing me in the 
right direction. Also, thank you to my Editor, William Rossi, and his publications 
team for their fine work getting this Comment ready for publication. 
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is finding a way of supporting yourself and your family. You 
don’t know about asylum, and the thought of turning to your 
new government for help never crossed your mind. Perhaps 
even after becoming aware of asylum, because of your past 
experiences, you do not trust any state officials. 
At any rate, the trauma you suffered prevents you from 
seeking help right away. When you think about the past, you 
re-experience that fear and pain, and you desperately avoid 
everything that reminds you of your old trauma. After time 
and (if you are lucky) treatment, you finally feel ready to seek 
asylum. However, you learn that you are too late. Your new 
government has deemed any application for asylum 
submitted more than a year after arrival in this new country 
to be presumptively fraudulent and barred. 
Unfortunately, this is an accurate description of the 
experience of many refugees seeking asylum in the United 
States. Asylum law in the United States imposes a one-year 
bar for all asylum applications. While this bar may be waived 
for certain changed or extraordinary circumstances—which 
include mental illnesses—the actual application of these 
exceptions is prohibitively narrow. As a result, many 
refugees who suffer from severe mental disorders that 
prevent them from applying for asylum are precluded from 
obtaining appropriate relief. 
This problem is not the result of spite or caprice on the 
part of adjudicating officials. Rather, the problem arises out 
of a misunderstanding of the nature of these disorders. 
Looking into other areas of law that have struggled to 
account for and explain mental processes may offer some help 
to these refugees. Specifically, the theory of learned 
helplessness, a central aspect of the Battered Woman’s 
Syndrome, could provide that help. 
First, Part I provides a brief overview of United States 
asylum law before moving on to a more detailed discussion of 
the one-year bar. This Part proposes that the one-year bar 
was a misguided effort at reform that has failed to further 
Congress’s objectives and poses an unfair obstacle to bona-
fide refugees. Part II discusses posttraumatic stress disorder 
(“PTSD”) and major depressive disorder (“MDD”)—the most 
prevalent mental disorders in the refugee community—and 
explains why these disorders are so common in that 
2016] LEARNED HELPLESSNESS AND PTSD 415 
 
community, and how refugees are affected by them. Part III 
outlines how immigration judges and asylum officers have 
adjudicated claims raising PTSD and MDD as extraordinary 
circumstances and explains why their analysis is often 
flawed. Part IV briefly discusses Battered Woman Syndrome 
by way of introducing the theory of learned helplessness, a 
model of behavior closely tied to both PTSD and MDD and 
one which the courts are familiar with. Finally, this 
Comment concludes with Part V, which argues that learned 
helplessness, as a straight forward and intuitive theory, is 
well-suited for explaining the effects of PTSD and MDD on 
refugees and (1) provides support for the abolition of the one-
year bar; and (2) supplies late-filing refugees a way to 
demonstrate that their mental ailments are extraordinary 
circumstances within the framework of the current law.  
I. OVERVIEW OF UNITED STATES ASYLUM LAW 
AND THE ONE-YEAR BAR 
A. International Asylum Law 
Responding to a massive increase in refugees fleeing 
Europe following World War II,1 the United Nations (“UN”) 
adopted the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (“the Convention”).2 The Convention formalized the 
rights belonging to refugees and the legal obligations of 
participating states.3 These include a guarantee of non-
rejection at borders and fair procedures for determining an 
applicant’s refugee status.4 The principal legal obligation 
imposed on participating states, however, is the duty of 
  
 1. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, THE 1951 CONVENTION 
RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967 PROTOCOL 1 (Sept. 2011), 
http://www.unhcr.org/4ec262df9.html [hereinafter UNHCR, CONVENTION & 
PROTOCOL]. 
 2. United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, July 
28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter 1951 Convention]. 
 3. See PAUL WEIS, THE REFUGEE CONVENTION, 1951, at 32-36 (Paul Weis ed., 
1995) [hereinafter PAUL WEIS, CONVENTION]. 
 4. Scott Kuhagen, The Third—and Likely Fourth—Death of the Refugee 
Protection Act: Sensible Changes to Asylum Still Required, 21 TEMP. POL. & C.R. 
L. REV. 567, 571 (2012). 
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nonrefoulement, which prohibits participating states from 
returning a refugee to a country where he or she will face 
persecution.5  
To help standardize asylum law in signatory nations, the 
Convention also promulgated a universal definition of 
“refugee.”6 Under the Convention’s definition, a refugee is an 
individual who, “owing to well-founded fear of being 
persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, 
membership of a particular social group or political opinion, 
is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, 
owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the 
protection of that country.”7  
The provisions of the Convention were limited in reach 
and only required to apply to situations arising in Europe 
before January 1, 1951.8 Newly arising humanitarian crises 
compelled the UN and participating states to expand the 
reach of the Convention’s protections.9 This was 
accomplished through the 1967 Protocol Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (“1967 Protocol”), which incorporated the 
Convention in its entirety and removed the date and 
originating country limitations.10  
In 1968, the United States acceded to the 1967 Protocol.11 
While the United States is not a direct signatory of the 
  
 5. Lowenstein Int’l Human Rights Clinic, Aliens and the Duty of 
Nonrefoulement: Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 6 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 14 
(1993). 
 6. UNHCR, CONVENTION & PROTOCOL, supra note 1, at 3. 
 7. 1951 Convention, supra note 2, at 152. 
 8. Id. at 152-53. 
 9. UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK AND GUIDELINES 
ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 
CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES 6 
(2011), http://www.unhcr.org/3d58e13b4.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR HANDBOOK]; 
M.R. ALBORZI, EVALUATING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW: 
THE PROTECTION OF IRAQI REFUGEES 138-39 (2006). 
 10. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees art. I, ¶ 2, Jan. 31, 1967, 
606 U.N.T.S. 267. 
 11. Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, 606 U.N.T.S. 267; Nancy Kelly, Gender-
Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of Women, 26 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 625, 634 (1993). 
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Convention, because the 1967 Protocol incorporated the 
Convention, in acceding to the 1967 Protocol the United 
States became a party to the Convention as well.12 
B. Asylum Law in the United States 
Though the United States has a long history of offering 
protection and safe harbor to refugees, refugee status was 
determined on an ad-hoc, case-by-case basis until 1980.13 It 
was only when the Refugee Act of 1980 was passed that the 
United States formally codified its asylum law.14 Congress 
recognized that the Convention and 1967 Protocol carried 
legal—as well as moral—authority, and the Refugee Act was 
intended to “bring United States refugee law into 
conformance with [its treaty obligations under] the 1967 
United Nations Protocol.”15 Accordingly, the Refugee Act 
incorporated the Convention’s definition of refugee nearly 
verbatim.16 Under the Refugee Act, a refugee is  
any person who is outside any country of such person’s 
nationality . . . and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is 
unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of, 
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of 
persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in 
a particular social group, or political opinion.17 
To be granted asylum in the United States, an individual 
must demonstrate that they are a refugee according to this 
definition.18 To do so, an applicant must show that they (1) 
have a well-founded fear of future persecution; (2) based on 
the statutorily protected grounds of race, religion, 
  
 12. UNHCR HANDBOOK, supra note 9, at 6; JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS 
OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 110-11 (2005). 
 13. See Deborah E. Anker & Michael H. Posner, The Forty Year Crisis: A 
Legislative History of the Refugee Act of 1980, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 9, 12 (1981). 
 14. Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102. 
 15. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436 (1987). 
 16. Bassina Farbenblum, Executive Deference in U.S. Refugee Law: 
Internationalist Paths Through and Beyond Chevron, 60 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1068-69 
(2011). 
 17. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(a) (2012). 
 18. § 1158(b)(1)(A).  
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nationality, membership in a social group, or political 
opinion.19  
A well-founded fear of future persecution consists of both 
a subjective and objective element.20 The applicant must have 
an actual, subjective fear of persecution, and this fear must 
be objectively reasonable.21 A showing that the applicant 
suffered persecution in the past gives rise to a presumption 
that the applicant has a well-founded fear of future 
persecution.22 
There is no statutory or regulatory definition of 
persecution.23 However, while “courts have not ‘settled on a 
single, uniform definition,’” there is general agreement on 
what persecution entails24—persecution consists of a high 
degree of harm accompanied by some level of involvement by 
the government.25 
As for the harm aspect, persecution is “the infliction of 
suffering or harm upon those who differ (in race, 
religion[, nationality, social group,] or political opinion) in a 
way regarded as offensive.”26 Put differently, persecution is 
“the infliction or threat of death, torture, or injury to one’s 
person or freedom.”27 The level of harm required to find 
  
 19. §1101(a)(42). 
 20. Kyaw Zwar Tun v. INS, 445 F.3d 554, 564 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 21. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430-32 (1987). An objecively 
reasonable fear has been construed to mean only a 10% or higher chance of 
persecution if returned. Id. at 439-40. 
 22. 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(b)(1) (2015); see also, e.g., Imelda v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 611 
F.3d 724, 728 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 23. Gonzalez v. INS, 77 F.3d 1015, 1021 (7th Cir. 1996). 
 24. Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64, 72 (2d Cir. 2011) (quoting Ivanishvili 
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 433 F.3d 332, 340 (2d Cir. 2006)). 
 25. See, e.g., Garcia-Colindres v. Holder, 700 F.3d 1153, 1157 (8th Cir. 2012) 
(“The BIA has adopted, and we have approved as reasonable, a definition of 
persecution that requires a harm to be inflicted either by the government of [a 
country] or by persons or an organization that the government was unable or 
unwilling to control.”) (alteration in original) (quoting Menjivar v. Gonzales, 416 
F.3d 918, 921 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 26. In re S-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1328, 1336 (B.I.A. 2000). 
 27. Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975, 990 (8th Cir. 2004) (quoting Regalado-
Garcia v. INS, 305 F.3d 784, 787 (8th Cir. 2002)). 
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persecution is “more than mere discomfiture, 
unpleasantness, harassment, or unfair treatment.”28 Harm 
qualifying as persecution is often extreme and severe. 
Disturbingly common examples of persecution include 
various forms of torture,29 mutilation,30 rape,31 and other 
types of interpersonal violence.32 However, the effect of the 
harm must be considered in the cumulative, and the sum of 
relatively minor harms can rise to the level of persecution.33 
  
 28. Vasili v. Holder, 732 F.3d 83, 90 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Lopez-Castro v. 
Holder, 577 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2009)). 
 29. See, e.g., Ilunga v. Holder, 777 F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2015) (“The 
government sent Ilunga to prison where he spent more than a month in a small 
cell . . . . Ilunga suffered daily torture. Prison guards stabbed him and poured 
battery acid in the wounds. They shocked him with an electrical club, routinely 
whipped him, and raped him. . . . Ilunga . . . escaped from prison . . . [and] fled to 
Zambia . . . . While Ilunga remained in Zambia, the government tortured his 
family, raped his wife, and burned his home.”); Kann Vegas v. U.S. Att’y. Gen., 
356 F. App’x 326, 329 (11th Cir. 2009) (“When Kann Vegas awoke he was in a 
room, handcuffed, blindfolded, and hanging without a shirt. His captors beat him, 
electrocuted him, and doused him with water for twelve hours . . . .”). 
 30. See, e.g., Niang v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 1187, 1191-92 (10th Cir. 2005) 
(“When Ms. Niang was nearly 25, her family had a meeting in which they decided 
that she must consummate her marriage with Daud that evening. She again 
refused, and her family threw themselves on her, stripping her of her clothes, 
beating her, and burning her with a hot iron. Some then performed FGM on her 
‘[s]o that [she] wouldn’t be able to commit adultery and so that no one would want 
to have anything to do with [her]. And then she would be ashamed to show [her] 
body in front of another man.’” (alteration in original)). 
 31. See, e.g., Garcia-Martinez v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 1066, 1071 (9th Cir. 2004) 
(“One of the soldiers came back inside of the house, told my mother that she had 
to cook food for them, and took her by force to the kitchen and made her cook food 
for them. While my mother was in the kitchen cooking food and my father was 
tied up, I was left alone with one of the soldiers. The soldier hit me with his gun 
and fists and then held my arms down while he raped me. When he was finished, 
the other two soldiers took turns raping and beating me.”). 
 32. See, e.g., Vincent v. Holder, 632 F.3d 351, 356 (6th Cir. 2011) (“[T]he 
totality of the circumstances—which includes the killing of Vincent’s son and the 
house burning—satisfy a finding of past persecution.”); Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 
607, 610 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Voci indicated that . . . he was beaten up on many 
occasions by the police. Voci testified that seven of these beatings were severe, 
resulting in bleeding and scars. . . . On one occasion, the police beat Voci with the 
blunt end of a gun, breaking his knee and causing Voci to spend several weeks in 
the hospital.”). 
 33. Karki v. Holder, 715 F.3d 792, 805 (10th Cir. 2013) (“‘We do not look at 
each incident in isolation, but instead consider them collectively, because the 
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Aside from the harm requirement, persecution also 
“implies some connection to government action or inaction.”34 
This connection often exists through direct government 
involvement, where the persecutors are agents of the 
government acting at its direction.35 The government 
connection may also arise through acquiescence, where 
government officials are aware of the persecution but 
implicitly authorize it or refuse to take action to prevent it.36 
Finally, the connection may exist where, despite its best 
efforts, the government is simply unable to stop the 
persecutors.37 
Individuals present in the United States may apply for 
asylum two different ways.38 First, they may seek asylum 
  
cumulative effects of multiple incidents may constitute persecution.’” (quoting 
Ritonga v. Holder, 633 F.3d 971, 975 (10th Cir. 2011)). 
 34. Vasili v. Holder, 732 F.3d 83, 90 (1st Cir. 2013) (quoting Lopez-Castro v. 
Holder, 577 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2009)). 
 35. See, e.g., Mei Fun Wong v. Holder, 633 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 36. Vitug v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1056, 1066 (9th Cir. 2013) (“‘[A]wareness and 
willful blindness’ are sufficient to constitute acquiescence by government officials; 
actual knowledge or willful acceptance is not required.” (quoting Zheng v. 
Ashcroft, 332 F.3d 1186, 1197 (9th Cir. 2013)). 
 37. See, e.g., Nehad v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 962, 972 (9th Cir. 2008). 
 38. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., ASYLUM DIVISION OVERVIEW 9 
(Mar. 4, 2011), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Resources/
Resources%20for%20Congress/ Congressional%20 Reports/2011%20National%20
Immigration%20%26%20Consular%20Conference%20Presentations/Asylum%20
Division%20Overview.pdf [hereinafter ASYLUM DIVISION OVERVIEW]. Applying for 
asylum after arriving in the United States is not the only way for refugees to 
obtain asylum. Refugees who have fled persecution to other countries may be 
granted asylum in the United States through the Refugee Admissions Program. 
U.S. DEP’T STATE, REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (May 23, 2014), 
http://www.state.gov/j/prm/releases/factsheets/2014/228681.htm. These 
individuals first register as refugees with the United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (“UNHCR”). Id.; see also U.S. DEP’T STATE ET AL., PROPOSED REFUGEE 
ADMISSIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 2016: REPORT TO THE CONGRESS v-vi (Oct. 1, 2015), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/247982.pdf. The Department of 
State and the Department of Homeland Security interviews the refugee and 
conducts a medical and security screening. U.S. DEP’T STATE ET AL., supra. If the 
outcome of the interview and screenings are satisfactory, the refugee will be 
granted asylum in the United States. Id. 
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proactively through an affirmative asylum application.39 
Alternatively, individuals may defensively file for asylum in 
an Immigration Court.40 Affirmative asylum applications 
begin with the submission of an asylum application form to 
the United States Citizenship and Immigration Service 
(“USCIS”).41 The applicant then conducts a non-adversarial 
interview with an asylum officer at one of eight asylum 
offices.42 If the asylum officer finds the applicant credible and 
the applicant satisfies the requirements for asylum, the 
officer will grant the applicant asylum.43 If the asylum officer 
believes the applicant is not credible or does not meet the 
requirements for asylum, the officer will deny the application 
and—if the applicant does not have lawful status or requests 
review of the decision—forward the application to an 
immigration judge for a de novo determination.44 
Defensive asylum applications are filed reactively by 
individuals already in removal proceedings.45 These 
defensive applications, as well as appeals or referrals from 
an asylum office, are heard in an administrative court run by 
the Department of Justice’s Executive Office of Immigration 
  
 39. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGRATION SERVS., AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM PROCEDURES 
MANUAL 2 (Nov. 2013), http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/native
documents/Asylum_Procedures_Manual_2013.pdf [hereinafter AFFIRMATIVE 
ASYLUM MANUAL]. 
 40. ASYLUM DIVISION OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 9. 
 41. AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 39, at 4-5. For affirmative 
asylum applications, the applicant is first run through a security screening that 
includes running the applicants biometrics and conducting a background check. 
Id. at 5-7. If the background check returns satisfactory results, the applicant will 
conduct a non-adversarial interview with an asylum officer at one of eight asylum 
offices. See id. at 8-12, 29. 
 42. ASYLUM DIVISION OVERVIEW, supra note 38, at 4, 9-10.  
 43. AFFIRMATIVE ASYLUM MANUAL, supra note 39, at 23-24. 
 44. See Shoukat v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 151 F. App’x 110, 113 (3d Cir. 2005); 
Martins v. USCIS, 962 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1112 (N.D. Cal. 2013); 8 C.F.R. 
§§ 208.30(g), 1208.30(g); see also Rachel D. Settlage, Affirmatively Denied: The 
Detrimental Effects of A Reduced Grant Rate for Affirmative Asylum Seekers, 
27 B.U. INT’L L.J. 61, 71, 75 (2009). 
 45. Settlage, supra note 44, at 75. 
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Review (“EOIR”).46 Immigration Court proceedings are 
adversarial in nature and held in front of an immigration 
judge, opposed by counsel from DHS.47 Immigration Court 
decisions may be appealed to the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”).48 In turn, BIA decisions may be appealed to 
the federal court of appeals for the jurisdiction in which the 
Immigration Court originally adjudicated the application.49 
C. The One-Year Bar  
In the early 1990s, some members of Congress became 
convinced that the asylum system was being abused by 
individuals who were not bona-fide refugees.50 These 
Congress members believed that individuals in removal 
proceedings were applying for asylum defensively simply to 
delay their removal51 and that many applicants who were not 
actual refugees were applying for asylum solely to obtain 
work permits.52 It was felt that such meritless and fraudulent 
claims were imposing an excessive burden on the 
adjudication system.53 
In 1996, as a measure to combat this perceived fraud 
problem, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform 
  
 46. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF IMMIGRATION JUDGE, IMMIGRATION COURT PRACTICE 
MANUAL 1.2(a)-(d), 3.1(b)(iii) (2016). 
 47. EOIR at a Glance, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (Sept. 9, 2010), http://www.justice.
gov/eoir/press/2010/ EOIRataGlance09092010.htm. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. See 141 CONG. REC. E1635 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1995) (statement of Rep. 
Franks); Michele R. Pistone, Asylum Filing Deadlines: Unfair and Unnecessary, 
10 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 95, 102 (1996); see also 142 CONG. REC. S4468 (daily ed. May 
1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Simpson) (“We are not after the person from Iraq, or 
the Kurd, or those people. We are after the people gimmicking the system.”). 
 51. Karen Musalo & Marcelle Rice, Center for Gender & Refugee Studies: The 
Implementation of the One-Year Bar to Asylum, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. 
REV. 693, 695 (2008). 
 52. Misha Seay, Better Late than Never: A Critique of the United States’ Asylum 
Filing Deadline from International and Comparative Law Perspectives, 
34 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 407, 423 (2011). 
 53. Pistone, supra note 50, at 101-02. 
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and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”).54 Responding 
to the concerns discussed above, the IIRIRA established, 
among other things, a timeline during which asylum 
applications would be accepted.55 This provision provides that 
an applicant for asylum must demonstrate, by “clear and 
convincing evidence,” that their asylum application was filed 
within one year of their entry in the United States.56 In 
essence, the IIRIRA enacted a statute of limitations for 
asylum that begins to run on an alien’s arrival in the United 
States.57  
The original bill proposed a 30-day bar and included no 
exceptions.58 Despite concerns about fraud, many members of 
Congress wanted to ensure that legitimate asylum claims 
were not precluded by any time-bar.59 Mental disability was 
a special concern and was explicitly mentioned in the Senate 
debates as a circumstance that should give rise to an 
exception for untimely asylum applications.60 As Senator 
  
 54. Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 
104-208, Div. C, 110 Stat. 3009-546. 
 55. Philip G. Schrag et al., Rejecting Refugees: Homeland Security’s 
Administration of the One-Year Bar to Asylum, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 651, 670-
71 (2010). 
 56. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B) (2012). 
 57. Id. 
 58. Schrag et al., supra note 55, at 672. 
 59. 142 CONG. REC. S11839-40 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. 
Hatch) (indicating desire to “ensure that asylum is available to those with 
legitimate claims of asylum” and commitment to “ensuring that those with 
legitimate claims of asylum are not returned to persecution, particularly for 
technical deficiencies”); id. at S11840 (statement of Sen. Abraham) (“If the time 
limit and the exceptions you have discussed do not provide sufficient protection 
to aliens with bona fide claims of asylum, I will be prepared to work with my 
colleagues to address that problem.”); id. at S11904 (statement of Sen. Leahy) (“If 
the use of asylum claims defensively to ward off deportation is the problem, let us 
deal with that problem and not penalize refugees with valid asylum claims who 
were too traumatized or fearful to come forward until they had gotten settled in 
this new land.”); Musalo & Rice, supra note 51, at 695. 
 60. 142 CONG. REC. S11491 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch) 
(“Extraordinary circumstances excusing the delay could include, for instance, 
physical or mental disability . . . .”); 142 CONG. REC. S3299 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 
1996) (statement of Sen. DeWine) (“Among those excluded [by a time bar] would 
be . . . the very people who need more time to apply, the very people who deadlines 
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Edward Kennedy explained in a speech supporting an 
amendment to extend the original 30-day application 
deadline: 
The bottom line is that the cases where there appears to be the 
greatest validity of the persecution claims—the ones involving 
individuals whose lives would be endangered by a forced return to 
their particular countries—are often the most reluctant to come 
forward. They are individuals who have been, in the most 
instances, severely persecuted. They have been brutalized by their 
own governments. They have an inherent reluctance to come 
forward and to review their own stories before authority figures. 
Many of them are so traumatized by the kinds of persecution and 
torture they have undergone, they are psychologically unprepared 
to be able to do it. It takes a great deal of time for them to develop 
any kind of confidence in any kind of legal or judicial system, after 
what they have been through, and to muster the courage to come 
forward.61 
Ultimately, concern for protecting legitimate refugees 
motivated Congress to increase the timeline to one year and 
provide for exceptions that would waive untimely 
applications in certain situations.62 The exceptions were 
“intended to provide adequate protections to those with 
legitimate claims of asylum.”63 In order to avoid denying 
bona-fide refugees asylum, the exceptions to the one-year bar 
were designed to cover a broad range of circumstances in 
order to prevent denying asylum claims “for technical 
difficulties.”64 
Two separate exceptions to the one-year bar were 
recognized by the statute.65 First, an exception was granted 
for “changed circumstances” that “materially affect the 
  
would hurt the most. These are the people who have suffered a great trauma that 
prevents them from coming forward. . . . Time can cure the personal trauma and 
culture shock that prevents them from seeking asylum. Time can allow conditions 
to change back home. A time limit—any time limit—will place these people at 
risk.”). 
 61. 142 CONG. REC. S3282 (daily ed. Apr. 15, 1996). 
 62. Schrag et al., supra note 55, at 672. 
 63. 142 CONG. REC. S11840 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1996) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
 64. Id. 
 65. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D) (2012). 
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applicant’s eligibility for asylum.”66 This includes changes in 
United States law applicable to asylum, changes in the 
applicant’s circumstances, and/or changes in the conditions 
of the applicant’s home country.67 Second, an exception was 
made for “extraordinary circumstances relating to the delay 
in filing an application.”68 An applicant seeking an exception 
under either ground must “demonstrate[ ] to the satisfaction 
of the Attorney General”69 that either changed or 
extraordinary circumstances excused their failure to timely 
file.70 
Several years after the IIRIRA was enacted into law, the 
INS promulgated implementing regulations for the one-year 
bar.71 The regulations provide a nonexhaustive list of 
  
 66. Id. 
 67. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)(i)(A)-(C) (2015). 
 68. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D); see also 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.4(a)(4)-(5), 
1208.4(a)(4)-(5). 
 69. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). In other contexts, the BIA has explained that “to 
the satisfaction of the Attorney General” requires a showing of “credible evidence 
sufficiently persuasive to satisfy the Attorney General in the exercise of his 
reasonable judgment, considering the proof fairly and impartially.” In re Bufalino, 
12 I. & N. Dec. 277, 282 (B.I.A. 1967). This standard has been interpreted as 
equivalent to the “preponderance of the evidence” standard. U.S. CITIZENSHIP & 
IMMIGRATION SERVS., ASYLUM OFFICER BASIC TRAINING COURSE: ONE-YEAR FILING 
DEADLINE 21 (Mar. 23, 2009), http://www.uscis.gov/USCIS/Humanitarian/ 
Refugees%20%26%20Asylum/Asylum/AOBTC%20Lesson%20Plans/One-Year-
Filing-Deadline-31aug10.pdf [hereinafter FILING DEADLINE TRAINING COURSE]. 
 70. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). The statute enacting the one year bar originally 
precluded federal review of decisions regarding exceptions to the one year bar. 
See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(3) (“No Court shall have jurisdiction to review any 
determination of the Attorney General [as to exceptions to the one-year bar].”). In 
2005, Congress passed the REAL ID Act which modified the law to permit Courts 
of Appeals to review BIA decisions that raised constitutional questions or 
questions of law. Pub. L. No. 109–13, Div. B, § 106(a)(1)(A)(iii), 119 Stat. 231, 310 
(May 11, 2005) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D)) (explaining that “[n]othing 
in . . . any . . . provision of this Act . . . shall be construed as precluding review of 
constitutional claims or questions of law”). There is currently a circuit split as to 
whether, and the extent to which, a BIA determination regarding the applicability 
of exceptions to the one-year bar is reviewable. Compare Ramadan v. Gonzales, 
479 F.3d 646, 654 (9th Cir. 2007) (reviewable), with Ruiz v. Gonzalez, 479 F.3d 
762, 765 (11th Cir. 2007) (not reviewable). 
 71. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(a)(4)-(5); Seay, supra note 52, at 425. 
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circumstances which may excuse an untimely filing.72 Among 
these circumstances are “[s]erious illness or mental or 
physical disability, including any effects of persecution or 
violent harm suffered in the past, during the 1-year period 
after arrival.”73 
The existence of one of the enumerated examples is, by 
itself, insufficient to excuse an untimely asylum application.74 
Rather, the determination of whether an exception exists 
requires “an individualized analysis of the facts of the 
particular case.”75 The regulations for the one year bar 
provide that, even if an exception to the bar applies, the 
applicant bears the burden of proving that the subsequent 
delay was “reasonable under the circumstances.”76 The 
regulations further provide that the circumstance must not 
have been created intentionally by the applicant and must be 
directly related to failure to file.77  
Failure to demonstrate an exception to the one year bar 
does not necessarily prevent a refugee from obtaining any 
relief from removal.78 Withholding under the INA may still 
be available to refugees and is not subject to the one year 
bar.79 Withholding, like asylum, requires that an applicant 
  
 72. § 208.4(a)(4)-(5). 
 73. § 208.4(5)(i). Other extraordinary circumstances include legal disability, 
ineffective assistance of counsel, possessing another form of legal status, the 
rejection of an application submitted within the one-year period for technical 
defects, and/or death or serious illness of an immediate family member of the 
applicant. § 208.4(5)(ii)-(vi). 
 74. In re Y-C-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 286, 287-88 (B.I.A. 2002). 
 75. Id. at 288 (“[T]he respondent must establish the existence or occurrence of 
the extraordinary circumstances, must show that those circumstances directly 
relate to his failure to file the application within the 1-year period, and must 
demonstrate that the delay in filing was reasonable under the circumstances.”). 
 76. 8 C.F.R. §§ 208.4(a)(4)-(5), 1208.4(a)(4)-(5).  
 77. §§ 208.4(a)(5), 1208.4(a)(5). 
 78. See, e.g., Liu v. INS, 508 F.3d 716, 722 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 79. See, e.g., id. Applicants denied asylum may also obtain relief under the 
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), which is not subject to time bar. See 8 C.F.R. 
§ 208.16(c). To obtain CAT relief, an applicant must “establish that it is more 
likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the proposed country 
of removal.” § 208.16(c)(2). Though CAT “does not require that the prospective 
risk of torture be on account of certain protected grounds,” Kamalthas v. INS, 
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demonstrate that they are a refugee according to the 
statutory definition.80 However, withholding relief is subject 
to a higher standard of proof.81 Rather than simply 
demonstrating a reasonable fear of persecution, to be granted 
withholding, an applicant must show that they will probably 
suffer persecution if returned to their original country of 
residence (i.e., 10% vs. 51%).82  
Moreover, withholding does not grant a refugee the same 
rights and privileges available to those granted asylum. 
Refugees granted asylum can obtain derivative asylum 
status for their spouse and children, even if they are 
otherwise ineligible for asylum themselves.83 Derivative 
status applies not only to family members currently present 
in the United States, but also to family members present in 
other countries—enabling separated families to legally 
reunite.84 Derivative status is unavailable to refugees who 
are granted withholding relief.85 Refugees granted asylum 
  
251 F.3d 1279, 1280 (9th Cir. 2001), it still requires a nexus to government action 
or inaction. In re J-E-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 291 (B.I.A. 2002). Moreover, the harm 
required for actions to qualify as torture is much higher than that of persecution. 
See, e.g., id. CAT offers no path to citizenship, Musalo & Rice, supra note 51, at 
721, and the relief offered by CAT is temporary and may be revoked by the 
government. See Wanjiru v. Holder, 705 F.3d 258, 264 (7th Cir. 2013) (“Deferral 
of removal is a more temporary form of protection. It can be terminated more 
quickly and easily if an alien no longer is likely to be tortured in the country of 
removal, or if the U.S. government receives assurances that the alien will not be 
tortured if returned.”). 
 80. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3) (2012). 
 81. See, e.g., Mulyani v. Holder, 771 F.3d 190, 198 (4th Cir. 2014) 
(“Withholding of removal is also based on persecution but implicates a more 
demanding standard of proof.”) (quoting Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 446 n.3 
(4th Cir, 2011). 
 82. See, e.g., Mendoza v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 327 F.3d 1283, 1287 (11th Cir. 2003) 
(explaining that, to obtain withholding, “[a]n alien bears the burden of 
demonstrating that he more-likely-than-not would be persecuted or tortured upon 
his return to the country in question”). 
 83. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3). 
 84. Melanie A. Conroy, Refugees Themselves: The Asylum Case for Parents of 
Children at Risk of Female Genital Mutilation, 22 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 109, 111-12 
(2009). 
 85. Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(3)(A) (providing for derivative status), with 
8 U.S.C. § 1231 (not providing for derivative status). 
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also have a path to citizenship: Asylees are eligible to apply 
for permanent status within one year of being granted 
asylum and can then pursue citizenship like any other legal 
permanent resident.86 Withholding, on the other hand, 
provides no path to legal residence or citizenship.87 
D. Criticisms and Problems with the One-Year Bar 
The one year bar was an unnecessary measure based on 
a largely imagined problem.88 As the Commissioner of the 
INS explained, a filing deadline was “an idea born of 
assumptions about a system in the past that wasn’t working 
effectively.”89 By the time the provision came into law, the 
Justice Department had already developed and implemented 
a number of significant measures to prevent fraudulent 
asylum claims.90 Among these measures, a unit dedicated 
exclusively to adjudicating asylum claims was created within 
the INS.91 This unit utilized new procedures to quickly 
identify and grant meritorious claims while referring suspect 
  
 86. See 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b). 
 87. See Abdisalan v. Holder, 774 F.3d 517, 523 n.5 (9th Cir. 2014) (“The grant 
of asylum is a broader form of relief that sets one on a path to citizenship. One 
year after being granted asylum, an asylee may apply for adjustment of status to 
lawful permanent resident. In contrast, the grant of withholding of removal 
merely prevents one from being removed to the country where one’s life or 
freedom would be threatened on account of a protected ground.”) (citations 
omitted). 
 88. The one year bar (or at least the way the bar is applied, which is discussed 
more fully below) may also be in violation of the 1951 Convention, see, e.g., 
UNHCR EXEC. COMM., CONCLUSIONS ADOPTED BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE ON 
THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF REFUGEES 18, 19 (2009) (“While asylum-
seekers may be required to submit their asylum request within a certain time 
limit, failure to do so, or the non-fulfilment of other formal requirements, should 
not lead to an asylum request being excluded from consideration.”), which the 
United States is obligated to comply with. See INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 416 
(1984). 
 89. Pistone, supra note 50, at 102. 
 90. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, THE ASYLUM FILING DEADLINE: DENYING PROTECTION 
TO THE PERSECUTED AND UNDERMINING GOVERNMENTAL EFFICIENCY 3, 25-26 (Sept. 
2010) [hereinafter HRW, FILING DEADLINE]. 
 91. Pistone, supra note 50, at 102. 
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claims to Immigration Court for removal proceedings.92 The 
Department of Justice also removed much of the incentive for 
filing fraudulent asylum claims by reforming the procedures 
for obtaining employment authorization.93 
These measures were quite successful. In the three years 
preceding the enactment of the one year bar provisions, the 
yearly rate of completed asylum claims increased more than 
two fold.94 The rate of asylum claims submitted also fell, 
suggesting that many fraudulent or unmeritorious asylum 
applications had been discouraged.95 
However, even ceding the validity of Congress’s concern 
about fraudulent asylum applications, the bar has also 
produced the opposite result of its intended effect. A primary 
animating concern behind the bar was that the adjudicating 
agencies were being overwhelmed by frivolous asylum 
claims.96 Congress believed the one-year bar would help 
relieve this burden.97 Instead, the one-year bar has increased 
the strain on asylum offices and Immigration Courts.98  
For every asylum claim, the adjudicating official must 
now be satisfied, “by clear and convincing evidence,” that the 
application was filed within one year of the applicant arriving 
in the United States.99 Even when an application is filed on 
time, this adds to the time, effort, and expense required to 
adjudicate claims.100 However, a significant proportion of 
legitimate asylum seekers do not apply within one year of 
  
 92. Id. 
 93. Musalo & Rice, supra note 51, at 696. 
 94. Pistone, supra note 50, at 102. 
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 101-02. 
 97. Michele R. Pistone & Philip G. Schrag, The New Asylum Rule: Improved 
but Still Unfair, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1, 9 (2001) (“[M]embers of the 104th 
congress were intent on imposing a deadline, apparently under the belief that 
such a bar was necessary to prevent time-consuming adjudication of fraudulent 
applications.”). 
 98. HRW, FILING DEADLINE, supra note 90, at 14. 
 99. 8 C.F.R. § 1208.4(a)(2)(i)(A) (2015). 
 100. HRW, FILING DEADLINE, supra note 90, at 15. 
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arriving in the United States.101 With the majority of these 
applicants seeking an exception to the bar (in addition to 
other forms of relief), this has created two proceedings within 
one, greatly increasing the cost of adjudication and time 
required to process asylum applications.102 
Moreover, the one year bar has done a poor job 
separating legitimate asylum claims from fraudulent ones.103 
Instead, the one year bar is working to prevent legitimate 
refugees from obtaining appropriate relief.104 The available 
documentation is rife with examples of individuals being 
denied asylum on the basis of the one year bar who then go 
on to satisfy the higher standard of withholding or CAT.105 
The one-year bar does not prevent fraud. It serves only to 
punish legitimate refugees. 
Looking at the circumstances faced by newly arrived 
refugees demonstrates why the one-year bar is an 
inappropriate measure to screen legitimate asylum 
applications from fraudulent ones. Applying for asylum is a 
complex and demanding process.106 Refugees must fill out, in 
  
 101. See Pistone, supra note 50, at 96-97; see also NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUSTICE CTR. 
ET AL., THE ONE-YEAR ASYLUM DEADLINE AND THE BIA: NO PROTECTION, NO 
PROCESS 5 (Oct. 2010) [hereinafter NO PROTECTION] (“This study analyzed 3,472 
BIA cases, of which 662 (19 percent) involved the filing deadline.”); Michele R. 
Pistone & Philip G. Schrag, The 1996 Immigration Act: Asylum and Expedited 
Removal—What The INS Should Do, 73 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1565, 1566 (1996) 
(“A study by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights showed that in the past, 
only 38 percent of bona fide asylum applicants apply for asylum within one 
year.”). 
 102. HRW, FILING DEADLINE, supra note 90, at 15. 
 103. Musalo & Rice, supra note 51, at 699-700; see also NO PROTECTION, supra 
note 101, at 6 (“In approximately 46 percent of cases where the filing deadline is 
an issue, it is the only reason cited by the BIA as justifying the denial of asylum.”). 
 104. HRW, FILING DEADLINE, supra note 90, at 15-18. 
 105. See, e.g., Abdisalan v. Holder, 774 F.3d 517, 521 (9th Cir. 2014); Gasparyan 
v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1130, 1132 (9th Cir. 2013); Vrljicak v. Holder, 700 F.3d 1060, 
1061 (7th Cir. 2012); Vincent v. Holder, 632 F.3d 351, 352 (6th Cir. 2011); 
Khunaverdiants v. Mukasey, 548 F.3d 760, 764 (9th Cir. 2008); Viracacha v. 
Mukasey, 518 F.3d 511, 512-13 (7th Cir. 2008); Mlambo v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 297 
F. App’x 198, 199 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Musalo & Rice, supra note 51, at 699-
703. 
 106. See, e.g., Seay, supra note 52, at 428. 
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English, a complicated ten page form, and collect and compile 
and translate documentation to corroborate his or her 
story.107 Refugees fleeing persecution often leave their 
countries of nationality with little, if any, documentation.108 
Depending on the conditions back home, this documentation 
may be extraordinary difficult, if not impossible, to obtain.109 
Compounding these problems, many refugees are unable 
to afford legal representation to guide them through this 
process.110 As a result, they must learn about the substantive 
law and navigate the procedural aspects of the law by 
themselves.111 At the same time, often with minimal support 
and no work authorization, refugees must still find a way to 
support themselves, care for their families, and find a 
home.112 This must all be done in a new country with a foreign 
language and unfamiliar culture.113   
Perhaps most significantly, and the focus of the 
remainder of this Comment, the psychological effects of 
persecution on refugees have a profound negative impact on 
their ability to timely apply for asylum. The magnitude of 
this negative influence is directly tied to the severity of the 
persecution—the worse the trauma suffered, the more 
profound the impact is likely to be. Thus, the one-year bar 
has the perverse effect of placing a disproportionately higher 
burden on those individuals who have suffered the greatest 
injustice. 
  
 107. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. & U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FORM I-589, APPLICATION 
FOR ASYLUM AND FOR WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL: INSTRUCTIONS (2014), 
http://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/files/form/i-589instr.pdf. 
 108. Pistone & Schrag, supra note 97, at 1, 8-9. 
 109. Id. at 8-9. 
 110. HUMAN RIGHTS FIRST, REFUGEE WOMEN AT RISK: UNFAIR U.S. LAWS HURT 
ASYLUM SEEKERS 15 (2002), https://www.humanrightsfirst.org/wp-content/
uploads/pdf/refugee_women.pdf [hereinafter HRW, REFUGEE WOMEN AT RISK]. 
 111. Pistone & Schrag, supra note 97, at 52-53. 
 112. HRW, REFUGEE WOMEN AT RISK, supra note 110, at 15-16. 
 113. Schrag et al., supra note 55, at 672. See generally Walter Kalin, Troubled 
Communication: Cross-Cultural Misunderstandings in the Asylum-Hearing, 20 
INT’L MIGRATION REV. 230 (1986). 
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At every stage of asylum proceedings, adjudicating 
officials have consistently failed to appropriately and fairly 
recognize the negative effects of persecution. This failure has 
resulted in preventing those who have suffered the most from 
obtaining the relief they deserve and is a problem that must 
be addressed. 
II. MENTAL DISORDERS IN REFUGEE POPULATIONS 
Before addressing how claims that a mental condition 
excused an untimely application are adjudicated, it is 
essential to understand the nature of the mental disorders 
that plague many refugees.114 The most common mental 
disorders in the refugee population are posttraumatic stress 
disorder (“PTSD”) and major depressive disorder (“MDD”). 
This Part will discuss each of these disorders and then 
explain why they are so prevalent in the refugee community. 
A. Posttraumatic Stress Disorder 
PTSD has been recognized by mental health clinicians 
since the DSM-III was published in 1980.115 Previously 
recognized as an anxiety disorder, the newest iteration of the 
DSM, DSM-V, categorizes PTSD as a “Trauma and Stressor 
Related Disorder.”116 PTSD describes a constellation of 
symptoms that may materialize as the result of a very 
  
 114. Cf. Brandon R. White, Termination of Parental Rights of the Mentally 
Disabled in New York: A Call for Change, 34 BUFF. PUB. INT. L.J. 1 (2016) 
(examining social science research to support proposed amendment to state 
termination of parental rights statute). 
 115. Chris R. Brewin & Emily A. Holmes, Psychological Theories of 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 23 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 339, 339 (2003); Stuart 
L. Lustig, Symptoms of Trauma Among Political Asylum Applicants: Don’t be 
Fooled, 31 HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 725, 725 (2008). The medical 
community has recognized a PTSD-like trauma related mental condition, by 
various names, since at least the American Civil War. Charles B. Nemeroff et al., 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: A State-of-the-Science Review, 40 J. PSYCHIATRIC 
RES. 1, 2 (2006). 
 116. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, POSTTRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 1 (2013), 
http://www.dsm5.org/Documents/PTSD%20Fact%20Sheet.pdf [hereinafter PTSD 
FACTSHEET]. The DSM-V made only minor alterations to PTSD. Id. For the 
purposes of analysis these distinctions are largely inconsequential. Id. 
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stressful or traumatic event or series of events.117 To be 
diagnosed with PTSD, an individual must be exposed to (or 
perceive that he or she was exposed to) death, serious injury, 
or sexual violation.118 Additionally, the exposure must result 
from one or more of the following: (1) direct exposure to a 
traumatic event; (2) the witnessing of a traumatic event in 
person; (3) subsequently learning of a traumatic event that 
occurred to a close family member or friend; or (4) first-hand 
experiences with repeated or extreme exposure to details of a 
traumatic event.119  
The DSM-V recognizes four distinct clusters of symptoms 
resulting from PTSD: re-experiencing, avoidance, negative 
changes in cognition and mood, and hyperarousal.120 Re-
experiencing symptoms are spontaneous and intrusive 
memories of the precipitating traumatic event or events.121 
These memories are usually accompanied by the same 
emotional responses (e.g., fear or horror) that accompanied 
the original event.122 Re-experiencing symptoms may include 
reoccurring nightmares or flashbacks in which the individual 
re-experiences the traumatic event.123 Flashbacks are often 
  
 117. Id. 
 118. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS 271 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DSM-V]. 
 119. Id. The DSM-IV previously required that the individual experiencing the 
traumatic event respond with feelings of “intense fear, helplessness or horror.” 
PTSD FACTSHEET, supra note 116, at 1. It was found that this did not aid in 
predicting the onset of PTSD, and the requirement was deleted. Id. 
 120. DSM-V, supra note 118, at 271-72. The DSM-IV’s description of PTSD is 
largely the same as the newest iteration, but clustered these symptoms in three 
groups: intrusive memories; avoidance and numbing; and increased anxiety or 
heightened emotions. See AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC & STATISTICAL 
MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 463-68 (4th ed. 2000) [hereinafter DSM-IV]. 
 121. DSM-V, supra note 118, at 271; see also Matthew J. Friedman et al., 
Considering PTSD for DSM-5, 28 DEPRESSION & ANXIETY 750, 750-51 (2011); Jose 
A. Saporta, Jr. & Bessel A. van der Kolk, Psychobiological Consequences of Severe 
Trauma, in TORTURE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: CURRENT TREATMENT APPROACHES 
151, 153 (Metin Basoglu ed., 1992). 
 122. DSM-V, supra note 118, at 271.  
 123. Id.; Matthew J. Friedman, PTSD and Related Disorders, in POST-
TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 1, 2 (Dan J. Stein et al. eds., 2011); see also STEVE 
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precipitated by a “trigger”—a sensory stimulus that the 
individual has associated with the trauma.124 In more severe 
cases the individual may be unable to distinguish the 
memory from the present.125  
Avoidance symptoms describe the actions an individual 
suffering from PTSD takes to avoid external reminders of the 
trauma.126 Individuals suffering from PTSD often go to great 
lengths to avoid situations, places, or people that trigger 
memories, distressing thoughts, or feelings about the original 
trauma.127 For example, someone who developed PTSD after 
a car accident would be likely to avoid driving or riding in 
cars. The motivation to avoid thinking about past trauma 
often prevents individuals with PTSD from seeking 
treatment because it would require them to talk about the 
event.128  
The symptom cluster of negative changes in cognition 
and mood includes a number of changes in the ways PTSD 
afflicted individuals view themselves and others.129 This often 
includes “persistent (i.e., always or almost always) and 
exaggerated negative expectations regarding important 
aspects of life applied to oneself, others, or the future 
(e.g., . . . ‘People in authority can’t be trusted’).”130 Negative 
changes in cognition may also manifest as “persistent 
erroneous cognitions about the causes of the traumatic event 
that lead them to blame themselves or others[,] . . . [a] 
persistent negative mood state[,] . . . markedly diminished 
interest or participation in previously enjoyed 
activities, . . . estrange[ment] from other people[,] . . . a 
persistent inability to feel positive emotions,” and “an 
  
EARLE, COPPERHEAD ROAD (Universal City Records 1988) (“And now the D.E.A.’s 
got a chopper in the air. I wake up screaming like I’m back over there.”). 
 124. See Lustig, supra note 115, at 726. 
 125. DSM-V, supra note 118, at 271-72.  
 126. Id. at 271, 275; Friedman, supra note 123, at 763-64. 
 127. DSM-V, supra note 118, at 275. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Id.; see Friedman, supra note 123, at 10-11; Saporta & van der Kolk, supra 
note 121, at 153-54. 
 130. DSM-V, supra note 118, at 275. 
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inability to remember key aspects of the event.”131 Individuals 
with PTSD will often exhibit restricted emotional range and 
report feeling numb.132 This, in turn, negatively affects their 
ability to form and maintain normal relationships.133 These 
changes may also lead to the development of a foreshortened 
sense of the future, anticipation of a short life, and a difficulty 
planning for the future.134 
Hyperarousal symptoms represent a variety of 
behaviors, including “aggressive[,] . . . reckless or self-
destructive behavior” and “hypervigilance.”135 Individuals 
with PTSD are often at a constant state of alert  are and 
easily startled.136 This increased vigilance often leads to sleep 
disturbances and difficulty concentrating.137 
B. Depression 
All depressive disorders are characterized by a sad, 
empty, and/or irritable mood accompanied by somatic and 
cognitive changes that negatively influence the ability to 
function.138 The classic depressive disorder is MDD.139 MDD 
is diagnosed when an individual experiences discrete 
episodes of two or more weeks’ duration.140 Generally, 
however, these episodes last much longer.141 MDD is 
  
 131. Id. 
 132. Id.; Lustig, supra note 115, at 726. 
 133. DSM-V, supra note 118, at 275-76. 
 134. Friedman, supra note 123, at 14; Lustig, supra note 115, at 726. 
 135. DSM-V, supra note 118, at 272, 276; see also Saporta & van der Kolk, supra 
note 121, at 155-56. 
 136. DSM-V, supra note 118, at 276; Lustig, supra note 115, at 726. 
 137. DSM-V, supra note 118, at 276; Friedman, supra note 123, at 14-15. 
 138. DSM-V, supra note 118, at 155. 
 139. Id. at 160. The category of depressive disorders also includes Persistent 
Depressive Disorder (or Dysthymia), Disruptive Mood Dysregulation Disorder, 
Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder, Substance/Medication-Induced Depressive 
Disorder, Depressive Disorder Due to Another Medical Condition, and 
Unspecified Depressive Disorder. Id. at 155. 
 140. Id. at 163. 
 141. Id. 
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characterized by depressed mood and markedly diminished 
interest in or pleasure from activities.142 Other symptoms 
include significant weight loss or gain, insomnia or 
hypersomnia, psychomotor agitation or retardation, fatigue 
or loss of energy, feelings of worthlessness or guilt, 
diminished ability to think or concentrate, and suicidal 
ideation.143 For MDD to be diagnosed, these symptoms must 
be present nearly every day.144 
Individuals suffering from MDD describe their mood as 
depressed, sad, hopeless, discouraged, or numb.145 Loss of 
interest and pleasure is almost always a symptom of MDD 
and individuals lose interest in hobbies or activities they 
used to find enjoyable.146 Social withdrawal and distancing 
from family and friends is also very common in MDD.147 MDD 
can have a profound impact on an individual’s ability to 
think, concentrate, and make decisions.148 Because they are 
often easily distracted and experience pronounced memory 
loss, cognitively demanding pursuits can become impossible 
for individuals with MDD.149 At its worst, MDD can cause 
individuals to become catatonic or otherwise render them 
completely unable to conduct basic self-care.150 Even outside 
of these extreme cases, those with MDD experience a higher 
rate of physical illness and attendant pain as well as 
decreases in physical, social, and role functioning.151 
  
 142. Id. at 161. 
 143. Id. at 163-67. 
 144. Id. at 163.  
 145. Id. at 162. 
 146. Id. at 162-63. 
 147. Id. at 163. 
 148. Id. at 164. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 165-66. 
 151. Id. at 167. 
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C. PTSD and MDD are Highly Comorbid 
PTSD and MDD are highly comorbid.152 Estimates vary, 
but as many as two thirds of trauma survivors with PTSD 
also satisfy the diagnostic criteria for MDD.153 Additionally, 
95% of those with a diagnosis of PTSD will also develop MDD 
at some point in their life.154 In addition to symptoms of 
depression appearing more frequently in trauma survivors, 
when they do appear, depressive symptoms are more intense 
in those suffering from PTSD.155 
One reason for the high rate of comorbidity for PTSD and 
MDD is that the two disorders share common risk factors.156 
Particularly significant risk factors for the development of 
  
 152. Sayamwong E. Hammack et al., Overlapping Neurobiology of Learned 
Helplessness and Conditioned Defeat: Implications for PTSD and Mood Disorders, 
62 NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 565, 565 (2012); Shakeh Momartin et al., Comborbidity 
of PTSD and Depression: Associations with Trauma Exposure, Symptom Severity 
and Functional Impairment in Bosnian Refugees Resettled in Australia, 80 J. 
AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 231, 232 (2004); see also Rachel Yehuda et al., Effects of 
Trauma Exposure on the Cortisol Response to Dexamethasone Administration in 
PTSD and Major Depressive Disorder, 29 PSYCHONEUROENDOCIRNOLOGY 389, 390-
91 (2004). 
 153. Yehuda et al., supra note 152, at 390. Comorbidity studies often focus on 
particular at-risk groups, and while results vary, they consistently demonstrate 
a significant correlation. See Arieh Y. Shalev et al., Prospective Study of 
Posttraumatic Stress Disorder and Depression Following Trauma, 155 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 630, 630 (1998). For instance, co-occurrence of PTSD and MDD has 
been found in 30% of survivors of mass shootings, 29% of patients in burn units, 
53% of help-seeking survivors of motor vehicle accidents, and 56% of help-seeking 
war veterans. Id. at 631. 
 154. Michael Brune et al., Belief Systems as Coping Factors for Traumatized 
Refugees: A Pilot Study, 17 EUR. PSYCHIATRY 451, 452 (2002). 
 155. Shalev et al., supra note 153, at 630. 
 156. See Kylie Sutherland & Richard A. Bryant, Autobiographical Memory and 
the Self-Memory System in Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 22 J. ANXIETY 
DISORDERS 555, 555-56 (2008). There is some overlapping of symptoms for PTSD 
and MDD and, accordingly, some of this comorbidity may also be the result of 
diagnostic factors. See Sutherland & Bryant, supra, at 556 (“Although PTSD is 
nominally an anxiety disorder, it is also characterized by depressive 
symptomatology.”). 
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both PTSD and MDD are stress and unfavorable life 
conditions.157  
Individuals diagnosed with MDD tend to have 
experienced more negative life events, like those resulting 
from trauma, than individuals without MDD.158 Exposure to 
trauma has been “recognized as a major antecedent of both 
PTSD and MDD.”159 Traumatization in childhood or 
adolescence also increases both the risk that individuals will 
develop depression later in life as well as the likelihood that 
PTSD will develop as the result of a later, unrelated 
trauma.160  
In addition to creating a higher risk of developing PTSD 
and/or MDD, these same risk factors can also lead to 
aggravated symptoms in both.161 In essence, this can form a 
positive feedback loop. The presence of one disorder may 
contribute to the development of the other.162 The 
presentation of the second, in turn, can then lead to worsened 
symptoms in the first.163 When PTSD and depression occur 
together this tends to result in a very high level psychosocial 
impairment.164 
PTSD and MDD also appear to share similar causal 
mechanisms.165 It has been proposed, with substantial 
support, that a critical component of both MDD and PTSD is 
some kind of disruption in the central serotonin system.166 In 
  
 157. See Angela Nickerson et al., A Critical Review of Psychological Treatments 
of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in Refugees, 31 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. REV. 399, 412-
13 (2011). 
 158. Yoav Kohn et al., Increased Prevalence of Negative Life Events in Subtypes 
of Major Depressive Disorder, 42 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 57, 57, 61 (2001). 
 159. Yehuda et al., supra note 152, at 390. 
 160. Pallavi Nishith et al., Prior Interpersonal Trauma: The Contribution to 
Current PTSD Symptoms in Female Rape Victims, 109 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 20, 
20-21, 23-24 (2000). 
 161. See Brune et al., supra note 154, at 452. 
 162. See Momartin et al., supra note 152, at 236. 
 163. See Brune et al., supra note 154, at 451. 
 164. Momartin et al., supra note 152, at 232, 236. 
 165. Hammack et al., supra note 152, at 566. 
 166. Id.  
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light of this, it is unsurprising that a common and effective 
pharmacological treatment for both disorders is Selective 
Serotonin Reuptake Inhibitors (“SSRIs”).167 Both MDD and 
PTSD are also associated with elevations in corticotropin-
releasing factor (“CRF”).168 These common physiological 
factors may help explain why individuals with one of these 
disorders are more prone to developing the other.169 
D. PTSD and MDD in Refugees 
Studies conducted on refugee mental health in a broad 
array of settings consistently show higher rates of 
psychological disorders—particularly mood, anxiety, and 
trauma disorders—in refugee populations than in non-
refugee populations.170 This is especially true for PTSD and 
MDD.171 Estimates vary between groups, but PTSD likely 
occurs at a rate of over thirty percent for refugees as a 
whole.172 Compare this rate to that for the general U.S. 
  
 167. Id. 
 168. Yehuda et al., supra note 152, at 399. 
 169. See, e.g., id. 
 170. Nickerson et al., supra note 157, at 400. 
 171. Belinda Graham et al., Overgeneral Memory in Asylum Seekers and 
Refugees, 45 J. BEHAV. THERAPY & EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHIATRY 375, 377 (2014) 
(“PTSD and depression are highly co-morbid particularly in the refugee 
population . . .”) (citations omitted). 
 172. Studies on PTSD prevalence in refugees and asylum seekers often focus on 
those fleeing particular countries in varying circumstances. Rates of PTSD in 
these groups vary. By way of example, a 2002 study found that 4% of Vietnamese 
refugees resettled in Austraila suffer from PTSD, Zachary Steel et al., Long-Term 
Effect of Psychological Trauma on the Mental Health of Vietnamese Refugees 
Resettled in Australia: A Population-Based Study, 360 LANCET 1056, 1057-58 
(2002), a 1998 study found that 90% of former Vietnamese political detainees 
resettled in Boston between 1990–1992 suffered from PTSD, Richard F. Mollica 
et al., The Dose-Effect Relationships Between Torture and Psychiatric Symptoms 
in Vietnamese Ex-Political Detainees and a Comparison Group, 186 J. NERVOUS 
& MENTAL DISEASE 543, 543-44 (1998) [hereinafter Mollica et al., Torture], and a 
1999 study found 26.3% of Bosnian refugees living in a specific refugee camp 
suffered from PTSD, Richard F. Mollica et al., Disability Associated with 
Psychiatric Comorbidity and Health Status in Bosnian Refugees Living in 
Croatia, 281 JAMA 433, 434, 436 (1999) [hereinafter Mollica et al., Bosnian 
Refugees]. A meta-analysis of 181 studies estimated that the rate of PTSD 
occurrence in all refugee groups was 30.6%. Zachary Steel et al., Association of 
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population, which only suffers from PTSD at a rate of about 
3.5 percent.173 Outside the United States, the rate appears to 
be even lower.174 The rate of depression in refugee 
populations has been estimated to be as high as nearly forty 
percent.175 MDD occurs in the general U.S. population at a 
rate of about 6.7%, though this rate varies among different 
groups.176 
The high rate of PTSD in refugee populations can largely 
be explained by two unique aspects of the refugee condition.177 
First, the nature of the trauma refugees suffer as a result of 
their persecution is especially conducive to the development 
of PTSD with particularly severe symptoms.178 Second, 
events that often occur subsequent to a refugee’s escape from 
persecution increases refugees’ susceptibility to PTSD and 
MDD and are likely to aggravate resulting symptoms.179  
The most obvious reason for the high rate of PTSD and 
MDD in refugees is the persecution at the core of their status 
  
Torture and Other Potentially Traumatic Events with Mental Health Outcomes 
Among Populations Exposed to Mass Conflict and Displacement: A Systematic 
Review and Meta-Analysis, 302 JAMA 537, 537 (2009). But see Mina Fazel et al., 
Prevalence of Serious Mental Disorder in 7000 Refugees Resettled in Western 
Countries: A Systematic Review, 365 LANCET 1309, 1310 (2005) (discussing meta-
analysis and suggesting that the rate of PTSD among all groups of refugees is 
approximately 10%). 
 173. Ronald C. Kessler et al., Prevalence, Severity, and Comorbidity of 12-Month 
DSM-IV Disorders in the National Comorbidity Survey Replication, 62 ARCHIVES 
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 617, 621 (2005).  
 174. See id. at 617. 
 175. Mollica et al., Bosnian Refugees, supra note 172, at 437. Like the estimates 
of PTSD prevalence, these estimates vary across different refugee groups and 
studies. Michael Hollifield et al., Measuring Trauma and Health Status in 
Refugees: A Critical Review, 288 JAMA 611, 611 (2002) (noting variation in 
studies, which have found refugees to suffer from PTSD at rates of 4–86% and 
depression at rates of 5–31%). 
 176. DSM-V, supra note 118, at 166. For example, the rate of MDD in 
individuals between 18 and 29 years old is three times higher than that for 
individuals 60 years or older. Id. Females are also 1.5 to 3 times more likely to 
suffer MDD than males. Id. 
 177. Brune et al., supra note 154, at 451.  
 178. Id. at 451-52. 
 179. Id. 
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as refugees. While individuals are classified as refugees 
solely on the basis of a fear of future persecution, many, if not 
most, refugees have actually suffered persecution in the 
past.180 Persecution often includes incredibly traumatic and 
violent human rights violations and crimes like torture, 
murder, mutilation, and rape.181 This type of severe trauma 
is closely linked to higher likelihoods of developing both 
stress disorders and depression.182 Moreover, persecution 
necessitates that the trauma suffered was harm inflicted 
through the intentional actions of other humans.183 Intimate, 
interpersonal violence is more likely to lead to PTSD than 
other kinds of trauma and tends to result in much more 
severe symptoms.184 PTSD resulting from interpersonal 
violence is also more difficult to treat and recover from.185 
Additionally, a refugee’s trauma is often not the result of 
a single discrete incident, but rather prolonged and repeated 
  
 180. See, e.g., Pistone & Schrag, supra note 97, at 33. 
 181. See, e.g., Gathungu v. Holder, 725 F.3d 900, 902 (8th Cir. 2013) (“The men 
gave him hallucinogenic drugs, beat him, and hung him upside down over a fire, 
causing him to lose consciousness several times.”); Bah v. Mukasey, 529 F.3d 99, 
102 (2d Cir. 2008) (“Genital Mutilation is often performed under unsanitary 
conditions with highly rudimentary instruments. The procedure is carried out 
with special knives, scissors, scalpels, pieces of glass or razor blades in poor light 
and septic conditions. . . . Genital mutilation can have devastating, permanent 
effects on victims, including immediate and long-term physical problems such as 
infection, difficulty during urination and menstruation, incontinence, and sexual 
dysfunction; complications during child birth such as fetal and maternal death, 
birth defects, and internal damage to the mother; and severe psychological 
problems.”) (citations and alterations omitted); Kebede v. Ashcroft, 366 F.3d 808, 
810 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Kebede testified that she tried to run, but that the soldiers 
held her while ripping off her clothes. The soldiers then beat her, and each took 
turns raping her while the other held her down.”); In Re D-V-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 77, 
78 (B.I.A. 1993) (“The applicant stated that the soldiers subsequently came to her 
family home where they gang-raped and severely beat her.”).  
 182. See Murat Paker et al., Psychological Effects of Torture: An Empirical 
Study of Tortured and Non-Tortured Non-Political Prisoners, in TORTURE AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES: CURRENT TREATMENT APPROACHES 72, 80 (Metin Basoglu ed., 
1992); Shalev et al., supra note 153, at 631. 
 183. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A) (2012). 
 184. See DSM-V, supra note 118, at 274-76; Nishith et al., supra note 160 
passim; see also Mollica et al., Torture, supra note 172, at 543-44, 550. 
 185. See Nickerson et al., supra note 157, at 412-13. 
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actions.186 While a single traumatic event can cause PTSD by 
itself, this type of repeated exposure to multiple traumatic 
events is much more likely to result in PTSD.187 Add to this 
the fact that refugees not only experience trauma directly, 
but also indirectly when friends and family are subjected to 
the same.188 Witnessing trauma experienced to others can 
lead to PTSD and MDD by itself.189 In combination with 
trauma suffered personally, this gives rise to an even greater 
likelihood of developing these disorders with more severe 
attendant symptoms.190 
A less obvious, but still very significant, factor in the high 
rate of PTSD is the impact of resettlement difficulties.191 
  
 186. Vitug v. Holder, 723 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2013) (describing rape, 
abuse, and other mistreatment of petitioner for “perceived effeminate behavior 
and homosexuality” beginning at the age of three and lasting until petitioner fled 
country at the age of twenty); Kholyavskiy v. Mukasey, 540 F.3d 555, 559-60 (7th 
Cir. 2008) (describing abuse on account of petitioner and his family’s membership 
in a minority religious group lasting from birth until family fled country when 
petitioner was fifteen years old); Voci v. Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 610 (3d Cir. 2005) 
(describing over ten years of continuous threats and intimidation with repeated 
and severe beatings). 
 187. Nishith et al., supra note 160, at 20; Joseph Ssenyonga et al., Posttraumatic 
Growth, Resilience, and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) Among Refugees, 
82 PROCEDIA–SOC. & BEHAV. SCI. 144, 147 (2013). 
 188. Flores v. Holder, 699 F.3d 998, 1000-01 (8th Cir. 2012) (“In 1988, guerillas 
went to his father’s house. The guerillas attempted to extort Flores’s father and 
also asked about Flores’s whereabouts. When Flores’s father refused to meet the 
guerillas’ extortion demands, the guerillas killed him. . . . When Flores’s mother 
refused to give information on his whereabouts, the guerillas killed her and raped 
Flores’s fifteen-year-old sister. The guerillas later returned and killed Flores’s 
stepfather.”); Zubeda v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 463, 467 (3d Cir. 2003) (“Zubeda said 
that these soldiers tied her father and brother and forced them to watch as they 
gang raped her. When they were finished, the soldiers decapitated her father and 
brother with machetes and set fire to the family home while Zubeda’s mother and 
sister were still inside.”). 
 189. Louise Silvern et al., Individual Psychotherapy for the Traumatized 
Children of Abused Women, in ENDING THE CYCLE OF VIOLENCE: COMMUNITY 
RESPONSES TO CHILDREN OF BATTERED WOMEN 43, 44 (Einat Peled et al. 
eds., 1995). 
 190. Silvern et al., supra note 189, at 44-45. 
 191. Sabina Palic & Ask Elklit, Psychosocial Treatment of Posttraumatic Stress 
Disorder in Adult Refugees: A Systematic Review of Prospective Treatment 
Outcome Studies and a Critique, 131 J. AFFECTIVE DISORDERS 8, 9 (2011). 
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Refugees’ problems do not begin and end with the original 
persecution, and negative life events are generally associated 
with higher rates of depression.192 Fleeing from their home, 
and often families, imposes additional stress and leads to a 
greater chance of developing PTSD and MDD and can 
exasperate the symptoms of already occurring PTSD.193 
Subsequent detention in the destination country is among 
the worst of these post-migration stressors.194 Separation 
from family and friends, fear for those remaining in the 
country, and insecure immigration status also have a 
significant negative impact on refugee mental health.195 
III. INTERPRETATION OF THE EXCEPTIONS BY ADJUDICATING 
AGENCIES 
With a better understanding of the mental conditions at 
issue, we now move on to how claims that PTSD and MDD 
are extraordinary circumstances are being adjudicated. As 
will be shown, while much of the earlier understanding of the 
exceptions mirrored the broad, flexible mandate intended by 
Congress, the current understanding of the exceptions has 
drastically shifted to an increasingly narrow approach. 
The official and explicit guidance that has been given to 
adjudicating officials is minimal. There is only one published 
BIA decision addressing extraordinary circumstances and 
the opinion does little more than restate the language of the 
regulations.196 Most federal courts of appeal will also not 
review Immigration Court and BIA decisions on exceptions 
to the bar. In light of this lack of guidance, USCIS training 
  
 192. Kohn et al., supra note 158, at 57. 
 193. Nickerson et al., supra note 157, at 400. 
 194. Allen Keller et al., Mental Health of Detained Asylum Seekers, 362 LANCET 
1721, 1721-23 (2003). 
 195. See Palic & Elklit, supra note 191, at 9. 
 196. In re Y-C-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 286, 287-88 (B.I.A. 2002). 
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materials for asylum officers take a position of particular 
significance.197 
The USCIS emphasizes that asylum officers must utilize 
a “flexible and inclusive” approach in evaluating 
extraordinary circumstances.198 In regards to the enumerated 
exception of “serious illness or mental or physical disability,” 
training materials explain that “serious illness or mental or 
physical disability include[s] any effects of persecution or 
violent harm suffered in the past.”199 USCIS recognizes that 
torture or severe trauma “may result in serious illness or 
mental or physical disability.”200 Moreover, the USCIS 
acknowledges that “[e]ffects of persecution can include 
inability to recall details, severe lack of focus, problems with 
eating and sleeping, and other posttraumatic stress 
disorder . . . symptoms.”201 As such, if applicants suffered 
torture or trauma, it is important that asylum officers “elicit 
information about any continuing effects from that torture or 
trauma.”202  
Recognizing the regulation’s enumerated list of 
extraordinary circumstances, the training materials on the 
one-year bar also include a list of additional examples not 
explicitly mentioned in the regulations.203 These include 
“severe family or spousal opposition, extreme isolation within 
a refugee community, profound language barriers, or 
profound difficulties in cultural acclimatization,” if these 
factors “had a severe enough impact on the applicant’s 
functioning to have produced a significant barrier to timely 
filing.”204 
  
 197. Leena Khandwala et al., The One-Year Bar: Denying Protection to Bona 
Fide Refugees, Contrary to Congressional Intent and Violative of International 
Law, 05-08 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1, 3 (2005). 
 198. FILING DEADLINE TRAINING COURSE, supra note 69, at 21-22. 
 199. Id. at 13, 14. 
 200. Id. at 14. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 13, 20. 
 204. Id. 
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Congress’ original intent was for the exceptions to be 
broadly applied. The language discussed above appears to 
recognize this intention. However, an examination of actual 
decisions regarding whether PTSD and MDD qualifies as an 
extraordinary circumstance belies an increasingly narrow 
and demanding interpretation.205  
 A victim of domestic abuse from Guatemala filed for asy-
lum outside the one year deadline.206 She presented evi-
dence of PTSD and argued that her mental condition con-
stituted an extraordinary circumstance excusing her fail-
ure to timely file for asylum.207 The immigration judge 
held that the applicant’s PTSD did not rise to the level 
necessary to excuse her untimely application.208 In sup-
port of this conclusion the immigration judge cited evi-
dence showing that, since the applicant’s arrival in the 
United States, she had found employment and paid her 
bills.209 
 Similarly, an asylum applicant fleeing female genital cut-
ting (“FGC”) in Kenya was denied an extraordinary cir-
cumstances exception despite her mental health issues.210 
Applying to USCIS with an affirmative application, the 
applicant submitted a psychologist evaluation to show she 
  
 205. The BIA and Immigration Courts publish very few cases and often provide 
very little substantive analysis of denials. See NO PROTECTION, supra note 101, at 
7-8. Moreover, few federal courts even entertain challenges to decisions regarding 
decisions on one-year bar exceptions. See, e.g., Ruiz v. Gonzalez, 479 F.3d 762, 
765 (11th Cir. 2007). In those few courts, most of the decisions on this issue appear 
in unpublished decisions with minimal discussion. See, e.g., Uppal v. Gonzales, 
240 F. App’x 243, 244 (9th Cir. 2007). This dearth of precedent is a serious 
problem by itself but one that is beyond the limited scope of this Comment. The 
Center for Gender and Refugee Studies and Human Rights First have both done 
an admirable job of compiling data on asylum cases that do not appear in official 
adjudicating materials. See generally HRW, FILING DEADLINE, supra note 90; 
Musalo & Rice, supra note 51. The following cases are examples culled from this 
data. 
 206. Musalo & Rice, supra note 51, at 700. 
 207. Id.  
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. After being denied asylum, the applicant in this case was ultimately 
granted withholding and CAT relief. Id. 
 210. HRW, FILING DEADLINE, supra note 90, at 31-32. 
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was excused from her untimely failure by her mental is-
sues.211 The psychologist diagnosed the applicant with 
PTSD and MDD and concluded that her condition signifi-
cantly interfered with her ability to function.212 Noting 
that the applicant’s condition had not prevented her from 
attending church during the year immediately after she 
arrived in the United States, the asylum officer concluded 
that the applicant’s mental conditions did not excuse her 
late application.213 
 Another woman fleeing FGC in Kenya, as well as an ex-
tremely abusive husband, was similarly denied an excep-
tion despite a diagnosis of PTSD.214 The immigration 
judge accepted the applicant’s diagnosis of PTSD.215 How-
ever, the immigration judge was impressed by the appli-
cant’s well written pro se application and found that the 
applicant had shown “entrepreneurial skills” in raising 
money and caring for her children while she was homeless 
in the United States.216 Because of this, the immigration 
judge did not see how her PTSD could be directly related 
to her untimely failure.217 
 A woman from Gambia was forced to marry a man who, 
for decades, raped and physically abused her.218 After at-
tempting to leave him multiple times she was finally able 
to escape to the United States. Suffering from PTSD and 
MDD, the woman did not learn about asylum until after 
she had been in the United States for several years.219 The 
applicant submitted a medical evaluation diagnosing her 
with PTSD and MDD but her application was rejected by 
  
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. at 32. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Musalo & Rice, supra note 51, at 704-05. 
 215. Id. at 705. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. The applicant in this case was granted withholding of removal. Id. 
 218. HRW, FILING DEADLINE, supra note 90, at 31. 
 219. Id. 
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the asylum office and Immigration Court.220 The immi-
gration judge explained that he did not find her PTSD to 
constitute an extraordinary circumstance because the ap-
plicant was still “ab[le] to make appropriate life decisions 
[and] . . . relocate to take advantage of opportunities.”221 
 A woman from Turkmenistan fled to the United States af-
ter her son was killed for converting to Christianity and 
she was tortured.222 Suffering from extreme depression, 
panic attacks, and social isolation, she attempted suicide 
and was prescribed psychiatric medicine.223 Because of 
her mental condition, she only learned of the availability 
of asylum after the one-year deadline had passed.224 Her 
mental condition was found not to be an extraordinary cir-
cumstance and her application was rejected.225  
 After being kidnapped and held prisoner by sex traffick-
ers, an Albanian teenager escaped and fled to the United 
States as an unaccompanied minor.226 Only a month after 
the expiration of the application deadline, she applied for 
asylum.227 In Immigration Court, a clinical psychologist 
testified that the applicant suffered from PTSD and MDD 
and that this trauma had prevented her from speaking 
about the trauma she had experienced.228 The immigra-
tion judge held that the applicant’s mental conditions 
  
 220. Id. 
 221. Id.; see also Khan v. Filip, 554 F.3d 681, 686 (7th Cir. 2009) (“Khan asserted 
that he did not know about the one-year deadline and that his poor mental 
health—his depression and fear of being returned to Pakistan—compromised his 
ability to timely file for asylum. He argued that these were the sort of 
‘extraordinary circumstances’ that should excuse the late filing under 8 U.S.C. § 
1158(a)(2)(D), but the [immigration judge] disagreed.”). 
 222. HRW, FILING DEADLINE, supra note 90, at 31. 
 223. Id. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Musalo & Rice, supra note 51, at 705. 
 227. Id. But see Mukamusoni v. Ashcroft, 390 F.3d 110, 117 (1st Cir. 2004) 
(noting that immigration judge found applicant’s PTSD to be an extraordinary 
circumstance that waived untimely filing). 
 228. Musalo & Rice, supra note 51, at 705; see also Mlambo v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 
297 Fed. App’x 198, 200 (3d Cir. 2008) (“The hearing transcript suggests that the 
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could not excuse her untimely failure because they could 
not have prevented her from seeking out an attorney.229 
The above cases illustrate how many adjudicating 
officials consistently demonstrate a fundamental 
misunderstanding of the nature of mental disorders, 
particularly PTSD.230 The most common manifestation of this 
misunderstanding seems to be when claims that PTSD 
prevented timely applications are denied on the strength of 
evidence that the applicant’s mental condition did not 
interfere in other areas of their life.231 Adjudicating officials 
see this as evidence that an applicant’s PTSD or MDD is not 
directly related to their failure to timely file an application.232 
This flawed analysis ignores the fact that avoidance 
symptoms are a principle component of PTSD.233 An 
individual with PTSD might go about a great many aspects 
of their life with little or no difficulty if these activities do not 
remind them of their trauma.234 At the same time, this 
individual might be completely unable to deal with 
circumstances that remind them of their trauma.235 Such an 
individual might not be able discuss or deal with their past 
  
[immigration judge] did not believe that depression resulting from the separation 
from one’s family would constitute extraordinary circumstances because that is a 
factor present in all cases.”). 
 229. Musalo & Rice, supra note 51, at 705; see also Goromou v. Holder, 721 F.3d 
569, 575 (8th Cir. 2013) (explaining that the BIA held that the applicant’s PTSD 
and depression did not excuse untimely asylum application because “the mental 
problems or isolation [the applicant] faced were not significantly different from 
others seeking asylum in the United States”). 
 230. Maureen E. Cummins, Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Asylum: 
Procedural Safeguards Are Necessary, 29 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 283, 
313-14 (2013); cf. Ilunga v. Holder, 777 F.3d 199, 212 (4th Cir. 2015) (“In affirming 
the IJ[’s] [adverse credibility determination], the BIA summarily disagreed with 
Ilunga’s argument that it was normal for a victim of torture to appear 
‘uncomfortable’ given his experiences. The BIA’s disagreement manifests a basic 
misunderstanding of the human condition.”). 
 231. See Cummins, supra note 230, at 313-14. 
 232. See id. at 313; Musalo & Rice, supra note 51, at 703-07. 
 233. See supra Part II.A. 
 234. See Cummins, supra note 230, at 312-14. 
 235. See Lustig, supra note 115, at 725-26, 731. 
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persecution at all, let alone in the detail that is usually 
required to adequately demonstrate persecution.236 
IV. BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME AND LEARNED 
HELPLESSNESS 
This Comment does not propose that these decisions are 
the result of asylum officers and judges that are callous or ill-
intentioned. Rather, the problem here stems from a 
reasonable, but fundamental, misunderstanding of the 
mental disorders at issue. For those who have not been 
through it themselves, the effect of trauma on refugees is 
abstract and difficult to understand. This problem is not 
unique to asylum law. Reaching into another area of law that 
has presented very similar issues—excuse and justification 
in criminal law—may offer some guidance on how we might 
proceed.  
A. Battered Woman Syndrome 
Originally formulated by Dr. Lenore Walker, Battered 
Woman Syndrome (“BWS”) describes a condition which may 
occur in individuals who are subjected to sustained physical 
and psychological abuse at the hands of an intimate 
partner.237 BWS is primarily used in the courts as part of a 
defense strategy when a battered woman kills or assaults her 
significant other,238 and to explain changed testimony and 
rehabilitate a witness’s credibility.239 
  
 236. See id. 
 237. See, e.g., State v. Williams, 787 S.W.2d 308, 311 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990). See 
generally LEONE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979).  
 238. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lazarovich, 574 N.E.2d 340, 343-44 (Mass. 
1991). 
 239. See, e.g., State v. Haines, 860 N.E.2d 91, 99-100 (Ohio 2006) (“‘Because the 
victim’s credibility can be attacked during cross-examination of the victim or even 
during opening statements, the prosecution need not wait until rebuttal to 
present expert testimony on battered woman syndrome. Rather, such testimony 
may be presented as rehabilitative evidence during the state’s case-in-chief.’”) 
(quoting State v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 189, 193 (Minn. 1997). 
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Dr. Walker described BWS as the result of a continuous 
cycle consisting of three phases.240 Phase one, or “tension-
building,” involves minor incidents of physical and 
psychological abuse.241 This minor abuse builds over time and 
eventually accumulates in phase two—“acute battering 
incident.”242 Phase two involves a serious incident of physical 
abuse, often with significant injury to the battered partner.243 
Finally, phase three, or the “loving contrition phase,” 
involves a period of reprieve where the batterer pleads for 
forgiveness and promises to change.244 This eventually segues 
back into phase one and the cycle begins anew.245 
There are many factors that may prevent a battered 
woman from leaving an abusive relationship.246 Women are 
sometimes economically dependent on their abuser and 
unable to get by on their own.247 They may feel obligated to 
comply with social norms and embarrassed or ashamed of the 
failed relationship.248 Battered women are often kept socially 
isolated by their batterers.249 If children are involved, the 
battered woman may stay in the relationship out of concern 
for those children.250 One of the most significant of these 
  
 240. See LENORE E. A. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME 126-27 (2d ed. 
2000). 
 241. Id. at 126. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 126-27. 
 244. Id. at 127. 
 245. Id. 
 246. See Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic 
Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1191, 
1196 (1993). 
 247. Id. at 1233-34; Robert F. Schopp et al., Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert 
Testimony, and the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 1994 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 45, 88-89. 
 248. Michael B. Frisch & Cynthia J. MacKenzie, A Comparison of Formerly and 
Chronically Battered Women on Cognitive and Situational Dimensions, 
28 PSYCHOTHERAPY 339, 342 (1991). 
 249. Alafair S. Burke, Rational Actors, Self-Defense, and Duress: Making Sense, 
Not Syndromes, Out of the Battered Woman, 81 N.C. L. REV. 211, 271-72 (2002). 
 250. Dutton, supra note 246, at 1234. 
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obstacles, however, is fear of the abuser.251 Because attempts 
by battered women to remedy their situation often lead to 
increased abuse, this is a very legitimate fear.252  
The crux of BWS is the theory of learned helplessness.253 
Under this theory, after going through multiple cycles of the 
abuse described above, battered women may “become so 
demoralized and degraded by the fact that they cannot 
predict or control the violence that they sink into a state of 
psychological paralysis and become unable to take any action 
at all to improve or alter the situation.”254 The woman 
becomes convinced that there is nothing she can do to escape 
her situation without resorting to extreme measures.255 In 
effect, because of her experiences, a battered woman may 
learn to be helpless. BWS is used to explain why a battered 
woman would resort to such extreme measures and attack 
her abuser.256 
Courts have been reluctant to create an independent 
defense based on BWS.257 However, most jurisdictions 
recognize the relevance of BWS evidence within the 
constraints of traditional defenses.258 Expert testimony on 
  
 251. Id. at 1232-33; Burke, supra note 249, at 268-69. 
 252. Burke, supra note 249, at 268-69; Dalton, supra note 246, at 1232-33. 
 253. See Burke, supra note 247, at 223. 
 254. State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (N.J. 1984). 
 255. See, e.g., Schopp et al., supra note 247, at 52-53. 
 256. See, e.g., Joan H. Krause, Distorted Reflections of Battered Women Who 
Kill: A Response to Professor Dressler, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 555, 557 (2007). 
 257. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Miller, 634 A.2d 614, 621 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993).  
 258. See Bonner v. State, 740 So. 2d 439, 442 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998); People v. 
Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 10 (Cal. 1996); People v. Lafferty, 9 P.3d 1132, 1135 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1999); State v. Morquecho, 54 A.3d 609, 615 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002); Earl 
v. United States, 932 A.2d 1122, 1128 (D.C. 2007); State v. Hickson, 630 So. 2d 
172, 175 (Fla. 1993); Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683 (Ga. 1981); People v. 
Evans, 631 N.E.2d 281, 291 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); Marley v. State, 747 N.E.2d 1123, 
1127 (Ind. 2001); State v. Frei, 831 N.W.2d 70, 75 (Iowa 2013); State v. Hundley, 
693 P.2d 475, 479 (Kan. 1985); Springer v. Commonwealth, 998 S.W.2d 439, 454 
(Ky. 1999); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892, 894 (Me. 1981); State v. Smullen, 844 
A.2d 429, 444 (Md. 2004); Commonwealth v. Rodriquez, 633 N.E.2d 1039, 1042 
(Mass. 1994); People v. Wilson, 487 N.W.2d 822, 824-25 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992); 
State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 799 (Minn. 1989); May v. State, 460 So. 2d 
778, 785 (Miss. 1984); State v. Worrall, 220 S.W.3d 346, 349-50 (Mo. Ct. App. 
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BWS is generally admissible when used to establish 
credibility,259 explain why a battered woman stayed in an 
abusive relationship,260 and demonstrate the existence of a 
subjective belief of the need to defend as well as the 
reasonableness of such a belief.261 
There are significant problems with BWS.262 These 
problems, however, are beyond the scope of this Comment. 
The subject of BWS is broached only to introduce the theory 
of learned helplessness—a theory which has extensive 
support outside the context of BWS—and demonstrate that 
courts are familiar with, understand, and are receptive to 
this theory.263 
  
2007); Boykins v. State, 995 P.2d 474, 479 (Nev. 2000); State v. B.H., 870 A.2d 
273, 281 (N.J. 2005); People v. Wilcox, 788 N.Y.S.2d 503, 505 (App. Div. 2005); 
State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 819-20 (N.D. 1983); State v. Koss, 551 N.E.2d 
970, 974-75 (Ohio 1990); Bechtel v. State, 840 P.2d 1, 9 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992); 
State v. Moore, 695 P.2d 985, 990 (Or. 1985); Commonwealth v. Miller, 634 A.2d 
614, 621 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993); State v. Urena, 899 A.2d 1281, 1291 (R.I. 2006); 
State v. Hill, 339 S.E.2d 121, 122 (S.C. 1986); Richardson v. State, 906 S.W.2d 
646, 648 (Tex. App. 1995); State v. Hendrickson, 914 P.2d 1194, 1197 (Wash. 
1996); State v. Stewart, 719 S.E.2d 876, 884-85 (W. Va. 2011); State v. 
Richardson, 525 N.W.2d 378, 383 (Wis. Ct. App. 1994); Witt v. State, 892 P.2d 
132, 138 (Wyo. 1995). 
 259. See, e.g., State v. Griffin, 564 N.W.2d 370, 374-75 (Iowa 1997); People v. 
Seeley, 720 N.Y.S.2d 315, 319 (Sup. Ct. 2000). 
 260. See, e.g., People v. Williams, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 356, 363 (Ct. App. 2000) 
(holding that expert testimony on BWS is “appropriate to explain why [a battered 
woman] allowed [her abuser] to return to the family residence” or “why such a 
victim may return to the perpetrator”); Brown v. State, 750 S.E.2d 453, 459 
(Ga. Ct. App. 2013). 
 261. See, e.g., Bonner v. State, 740 So. 2d 439, 443-44 (Ala. Crim. App. 1998); 
People v. Jaspar, 119 Cal. Rptr. 2d 470, 471-76 (Ct. App. 2002). 
 262. Burke, supra note 249, at 223; Julianne Parfett, Beyond Battered Woman 
Syndrome Evidence: An Alternative Approach to the Use of Abuse Evidence in 
Spousal Homicide Cases, 12 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. ISSUES 55 (2001). 
Briefly, however, Walker’s experimental design and methodology has been 
attacked as seriously flawed. Burke, supra note 249, at 237-38. Additionally, from 
a feminist perspective, there have been criticisms that BWS “exploit[s] and, 
thereby, reproduc[es] norms that support the conditions of [women’s] 
subjugation.” Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 4 (1994). 
 263. In addition to the judiciary, several elements of the executive branch have 
demonstrated familiarity with the theory. Notably, learned helplessness was 
heavily incorporated in the CIA’s “enhanced interrogation” program. See SENATE 
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B. Learned Helplessness 
The theory of learned helplessness was first formulated 
by Martin Seligman.264 Seligman’s original laboratory 
experiment provides a straightforward, easy to comprehend 
demonstration of learned helplessness, and it is worthwhile 
to discuss it briefly. In that experiment, two sets of dogs were 
placed in a fenced-in area with an electricity conducting 
  
SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, COMMITTEE STUDY OF THE CIA’S DETENTION AND 
INTERROGATION PROGRAM 11 (2014) (“On the CIA’s behalf, the contract 
psychologists developed theories of interrogation based on ‘learned helplessness,’ 
and developed the list of enhanced interrogation techniques that was approved 
for use against Abu Zubaydah and subsequent CIA detainees.”) (citation omitted); 
see also id. at 19 n.32 (“‘Learned helplessness’ in this context was the theory that 
detainees might become passive and depressed in response to adverse or 
uncontrollable events, and would thus cooperate and provide information.”). The 
techniques utilized by the enhanced interrogation program were originally 
developed for use in the Resistance phase of the military’s Survival, Evasion, 
Resist, and Escape (“SERE”) training. See Memorandum from Stephen J. 
Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of 
Legal Counsel, to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel, C.I.A., Re: 
Application of United States Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention 
Against Torture to Certain Techniques that May be Used in the Interrogation of 
High Value al Qaeda Detainees 7-14, 37 (May 30, 2005). These techniques—which 
include, among others, dietary manipulation, nudity, stress positions, sleep 
deprivation, and waterboarding—were “designed to simulate conditions to which 
[U.S. military personnel] might be subject if taken prisoner by enemies that did 
not abide by the Geneva Conventions.” STAFF OF S. COMM. ON ARMED SERVS., 
110TH CONG., INQUIRY INTO THE TREATMENT OF DETAINEES IN U.S. CUSTODY xiii 
(Comm. Print, Nov. 20, 2008). The military recognized that soldiers involved in 
SERE training would be at risk for developing learned helplessness as a result of 
the training, and the SERE program included safeguards to prevent this 
eventuality. See M. GREGG BLOCHE, THE HIPPOCRATIC MYTH: WHY DOCTORS ARE 
UNDER PRESSURE TO RATION CARE, PRACTICE POLITICS, AND COMPROMISE THEIR 
PROMISE TO HEAL 129-31 (2011). The enhanced interrogation program, however—
whose “primary goal . . . [was] to create a state of learned helplessness and 
dependence conducive to the collection of intelligence in a predictable, reliable, 
and sustainable manner”—actively sought to develop and exploit those effects. 
Memorandum from Stephen J. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., 
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel, to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy 
Gen. Counsel, C.I.A., Re: Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to the Combined 
Use of Certain Techniques in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees 
59 (May 10, 2005). 
 264. Martin E. P. Seligman & Steven F. Maier, Failure to Escape Traumatic 
Shock, 74 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 1, 1-2 (1967). 
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floor.265 One group of dogs was tethered to the floor, while the 
other group was left free.266 The experimenters then ran an 
electrical current through the floor, shocking the dogs.267 The 
unrestrained dogs were able to jump the barrier and 
escape.268 The restrained dogs tried to jump out, but were 
unable to.269 After only a few iterations, the restrained dogs 
stopped trying to escape from the shocks.270 The 
experimenters then untethered the restrained dogs.271 Now, 
despite being entirely able to jump the fence and escape, 
when the experimenters shocked these newly untethered 
dogs, they only laid down on the floor and took the shocks.272 
Because these dogs’ previous attempts at escape were 
ineffectual, they had disassociated any response from the 
outcome—they had learned to be helpless.273  
As the theory was developed, Seligman and others found 
that it applied to human behavior as well.274 Experimentally, 
learned helplessness has been demonstrated in humans by, 
among other things, exposing subjects to uncontrollable 
aversive physical stimuli such as loud noises;275 tasking 
subjects with solving unsolvable cognitive tasks;276 and even 
having subjects observe others fail at solving cognitive 
  
 265. Id. at 2-3, 5. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. 
 268. Id. 
 269. Id. 
 270. Id. at 3-4. 
 271. Id. at 2-3, 5. 
 272. Id. at 3-4, 5-6. 
 273. Id. at 8-9. 
 274. See, e.g., Donald S. Hiroto & Martin E. P. Seligman, Generality of Learned 
Helplessness in Man, 31 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 311, 311-12 (1975); 
Martin E.P. Seligman, Learned Helplessness, 23 ANN. REV. MED. 407, 408 (1972). 
 275. See, e.g., Alan Brier et al., Controllable and Uncontrollable Stress in 
Humans: Alterations in Mood and Neuroendocrine and Psychophysiological 
Function, 1444 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1419, 1419 (1987); D.S. Hiroto, Locus of Control 
and Learned Helplessness, 102 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 187, 187 (1974). 
 276. See, e.g., David C. Klein et al., Learned Helplessness, Depression, and 
Attribution of Failure, 33 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 508 (1976). 
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tasks.277 In the real world, studies have also found high rates 
of learned helplessness effects in a number of diverse groups, 
including students,278 drug dependent individuals,279 the 
unemployed,280 individuals with chronic illnesses,281 and 
family members of patients being treated in intensive care 
units, among others.282 
In humans, exposure to uncontrollable events may often 
lead to the development of learned helplessness.283 This 
helpless behavior is primarily the result of two deficits: a 
difficulty recognizing a causal relationship between actions 
and outcomes and a reduction in motivation to respond to 
aversive stimuli.284 First, like the dogs described above, 
individuals exposed to adverse stimuli or other events they 
are unable to control may learn that any response is futile, 
fail to recognize controllable situations, and cease their 
efforts to change their circumstances.285 Second, motivation 
to respond and act is undermined by a perceived lack of 
control over one’s surroundings.286 When the situation 
  
 277. See Irvin Brown, Jr. & Dillon K. Inouye, Learned Helplessness Through 
Modeling: The Role of Perceived Similarity in Competence, 36 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 900, 905 (1978); Robert F. DeVellis et al., Vicarious Acquisition of 
Learned Helplessness, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 894, 898-99 (1978). 
 278. CHRISTOPHER PETERSON, STEVEN F. MAIER & MARTIN E.P. SELIGMAN, 
LEARNED HELPLESSNESS: A THEORY FOR THE AGE OF PERSONAL CONTROL 251-53 
(1993). 
 279. Robert C. Sterling et al., Learned Helplessness and Cocaine Dependence: 
An Investigation, 15 J. ADDICTIVE DISEASES 13, 13 (1996). 
 280. Arthur H. Goldsmith & William Darity, Jr., Social Psychology, 
Unemployment Exposure and Equilibrium Unemployment, 13 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 
449 (1992). 
 281. Sandra McGuinness, Learned Helplessness in the Multiple Sclerosis 
Population, 28 J. NEUROSCIENCE NURSING 163 (1996). 
 282. Donald R. Sullivan et al., Learned Helplessness Among Families and 
Surrogate Decision-Makers of Patients Admitted to Medical, Surgical, and 
Trauma ICUs, 142 CHEST 1140, 1141 (2012). 
 283. Steven F. Maier & Martin E.P. Seligman, Learned Helplessness: Theory 
and Evidence, 105 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSCYHOL.: GEN. 3, 3-4 (1976). 
 284. MARIO MIKULINCER, HUMAN LEARNED HELPLESSNESS: A COPING 
PERSPECTIVE 15-16 (1994); see also Maier & Seligman, supra note 283, at 13. 
 285. Nickerson et al., supra note 156, at 413. 
 286. Hammack et al., supra note 151, at 568-69. 
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changes and becomes controllable, however, this learned 
helpless behavior remains.287 
Moreover, the motivation deficiencies brought on by 
learned helplessness have, in many circumstances, been 
shown to be a somewhat generalized response.288 Individuals 
may not simply learn to be helpless in a single, discrete 
situation.289 Rather, motivation deficiencies may exist across 
a broad array of diverse circumstances unrelated to the 
precipitating stimuli.290 The higher the stakes involved—e.g., 
the more aversive or highly desired the outcome—the more 
likely generalized learned helplessness is to develop.291 
Learned helplessness also appears to be a major factor in 
the development of both depression and PTSD, and the 
perception of uncontrollability underlies multiple mood 
disorders.292 Uncontrollable stress, or at least the perception 
of uncontrollable stress, underlies a number of mental 
disorders.293 When animals develop learned helplessness they 
  
 287. Nickerson et al., supra note 156, at 413. 
 288. MIKULINCER, supra note 284, at 16-18; Lyn Y. Abramson, Martin E. P. 
Seligman & John D. Teasdale, Learned Helplessness in Humans: Critique and 
Reformulation, 87 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 49 (1978). 
 289. See Christopher R. Pryce et al., Establishing a Learned Helplessness Effect 
Paradigm in C57BL/6 Mice: Behavioural Evidence for Emotional, Motivational 
and Cognitive Effects of Aversive Uncontrollability per se, 
62 NEUROPHARMACOLOGY 358, 359 (2012). 
 290. See, e.g., Hiroto & Seligman, supra note 274, at 325-27. 
 291. Carsten Diener, Altered Associative Learning and Learned Helplessness in 
Major Depression, in PSYCHIATRIC DISORDERS: NEW FRONTIERS IN AFFECTIVE 
DISORDERS 57, 63 (Dieter Schoepf ed., 2013); see also Abramson, Seligman & 
Teasdale, supra note 288 at 68-70. 
 292. Vincent M. LoLordo & J. Bruce Overmier, Trauma, Learned Helplessness, 
Its Neuroscience, and Implications for Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, in 
ASSOCIATIVE LEARNING AND CONDITIONING THEORY: HUMAN AND NON-HUMAN 
APPLICATIONS 121, 139-42 (Todd R. Schachtman & Steve Reilly eds., 2011); Susan 
Mineka & Katherine Oehlberg, The Relevance of Recent Developments in 
Classical Conditioning to Understanding the Etiology and Maintenance of Anxiety 
Disorders, 127 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 567, 568-70 (2008); Christopher R. Pryce et 
al., Helplessness: A Systematic Translational Review of Theory and Evidence for 
its Relevance to Understanding and Treating Depression, 132 PHARMACOLOGY & 
THERAPEUTICS 242, 246-49 (2011). 
 293. Finn Somnier et al., Psychosocial Consequences of Torture: Current 
Knowledge and Evidence, in TORTURE AND ITS CONSEQUENCES: CURRENT 
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often develop a host of behaviors which closely mimic the 
symptoms of PTSD and depression.294 These behaviors 
include avoidance behaviors, changes in sleeping, eating, and 
drinking patterns, increased alcohol consumption, and 
antisocial behaviors to name a few.295 It is no surprise then 
that the feeling of being unable to control traumatic events is 
a significant risk factor for both PTSD and MDD.296  
V. APPLYING LEARNED HELPLESSNESS TO THE  
ONE-YEAR BAR 
Even for medical professionals, mental disorders like 
PTSD and MDD are complicated and difficult to understand. 
The endless editions and modifications of the American 
Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual 
are evidence enough of this.297 For adjudicators and parties in 
  
TREATMENT APPROACHES 56, 67 (Metin Basoglu ed., 1992); see also Steven F. 
Maier & Linda R. Watkins, Stressor Controllability and Learned Helplessness: 
The Roles of the Dorsal Raphe Nucleus, Serotonin, and Corticotropin-Releasing 
Factor, 29 NEUROSCIENCE & BEHAV. REV. 829, 837-38 (2005).  
 294. Maier & Watkins, supra note 293, at 830; Mineka & Oehlberg, supra note 
292, at 569. There are also similarities between PTSD and MDD and animal 
learned helplessness at the biological level. For example, learned helplessness is 
accompanied by an increase in serotonin activity in the dorsal raphe nucleus. 
Maier & Watkins, supra note 293, at 833-34. As discussed above, changes in 
serotonin activity are linked with both PTSD and MDD. See Hammack et al., 
supra note 151, at 566. Additionally, many classes of drugs traditionally used as 
antidepressants in humans have also been shown to attenuate the effects of 
learned helplessness in animal studies. See Hymie Anisman & Zul Merali, 
Learned Helplessness in Mice, in MOOD AND ANXIETY RELATED PHENOTYPES IN 
MICE 177, 180 (Todd D. Gould ed., 2009).  
 295. See Maier & Watkins, supra note 293, at 830; Joseph Volpicelli et al., The 
Role of Uncontrollable Trauma in the Development of PTSD and Alcohol 
Addiction, 23 ALCOHOL RES. & HEALTH 256, 258-60 (1999); see also Lustig, supra 
note 115, at 725-26. 
 296. Pryce et al., supra note 292, at 244 (“Learned helplessness . . . has been 
proposed to be a major aetiological process in vulnerability to and onset of MDD, 
and helplessness has been proposed as a major psychopathological mechanism in 
maintenance of MDD.”) (citations omitted); Volpicelli et al., supra note 295, at 
257-58. 
 297. See DSM-V, supra note 118; DSM-IV, supra note 120; AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (4th ed. 1994); 
AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL 
DISORDERS (3d ed. text rev. 1987); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND 
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asylum proceedings, this complexity is even more 
pronounced. Legal practitioners may be experts in their field 
of practice—the law—but they are laymen to the medical 
community.  
The theory of learned helplessness is very well suited to 
describing the effects of trauma on refugees. Indeed, a “lack 
of control over one’s circumstances is a key characteristic of 
virtually every state of the refugee experience. This may 
result in a pervasive sense of helplessness in refugees, and 
can be likened to the concept of ‘mental defeat.’”298  
Though there are many complexities to the theory of 
learned helplessness that this Comment has not deeply 
delved into, on its face, the effects are intuitive and the basic 
concept is easy to understand. The simplicity and 
straightforwardness of learned helplessness (at least on the 
surface) is where its true value lies in asylum adjudications. 
These qualities make learned helplessness extremely well 
suited to explaining the effects of PTSD and MDD to those 
not well versed in medicine or psychology. Inserting learned 
helplessness into the debate could serve an important role in 
asylum law, both in (1) demonstrating to legislators the 
inappropriateness of the one-year bar by adding to the wealth 
of data showing the bar is a very poor method for separating 
fraudulent asylum claims from legitimate ones; and (2) 
providing advocates a tool they can use to demonstrate 
extraordinary circumstances within the framework of the 
existing law. 
A. Learned Helplessness Offers More Support that the One- 
  Year Bar Should be Abolished as an Inappropriate    
  Obstacle to Obtaining Asylum 
The one-year bar is based on the presumption that, upon 
arriving in the United States, true refugees will run to the 
nearest asylum office post-haste and ask their new 
  
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS (2d ed. text rev. 1974); AM. 
PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 
(2d ed. 1968); AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF 
MENTAL DISORDERS (1st ed. 1952). 
 298. Nickerson et al., supra note 157, at 413. 
2016] LEARNED HELPLESSNESS AND PTSD 459 
 
government for help. This is an absurd expectation. A key 
element in the definition of refugee is government 
involvement in the persecution.299 This can mean one of two 
things. First, the government of the refugee’s home country 
or agents of that government were the actual persecutors.300 
Alternatively, if private actors were the persecutors, those 
private individuals acted with impunity while the 
government stood by and watched or was otherwise 
ineffectual.301 
Either way, someone who has been persecuted has 
learned, often over the course of many years, that turning to 
the government for help is pointless or even 
counterproductive and dangerous. After escaping to a new 
country many refugees would certainly remain, at the very 
least, skeptical of any government and hesitant to seek its 
assistance. Learned helplessness provides empirical support 
for this intuitive conclusion.  
Persecution, in all of its forms, is obviously an aversive 
stimulus. We might consider turning to law enforcement or 
other government officials, the most natural response to this 
stimulus. However, because the government is the persecutor 
(or at the least demonstrably unable to stop the persecutor) 
persecuted individuals would quickly learn that such 
“normal” responses aimed at alleviating this stimulus were 
futile. Their ability to recognize relationships between 
actions and outcomes along with their motivation to respond 
to aversive stimuli would become limited—especially in the 
context of seeking help from the government—and these 
effects would be reinforced the longer the refugee stayed in 
that situation.  
Like the battered women whose behavior BWS 
endeavors to explain, refugees then turn to more extreme 
measures—fleeing. The learned helplessness effects, 
  
 299. See, e.g., Vasili v. Holder, 732 F.3d 83, 90 (1st Cir. 2013) (noting that 
persecution “implies some connection to government action or inaction.”) (quoting 
Lopez-Castro v. Holder, 577 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2009).  
 300. See, e.g., Abdel-Masieh v. INS., 73 F.3d 579, 582 (5th Cir. 1996) (finding 
persecution where government was actual persecutor). 
 301. See, e.g., Sarhan v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 660 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding 
persecution by non-state actor where government was unwilling or unable to 
control actor). 
460 BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64 
 
however, would not disappear when their circumstances 
changed. Moreover, the motivational and pattern recognition 
deficiencies would not be strictly limited to the persecution 
stimulus, but would be much more generalized and extend 
broadly to other areas of a refugee’s day-to-day life.  
In this light, it appears unrealistic to expect anyone who 
has survived the trauma of persecution to reflexively accept 
and trust his or her new government with open arms, let 
alone actively seek out its help. Yet, this is exactly what the 
one-year filing deadline expects of legitimate refugees. 
Looking at the circumstances of refugees through the lens of 
learned helplessness helps demonstrate why the one-year 
bar is fundamentally flawed as a measure to prevent 
fraudulent asylum applications. 
B. In the Meantime, Learned Helplessness Can Offer   
  Refugees Help in the Present 
  
Learned helplessness also offers practitioners and 
advocates a tool they can use now. Because learned 
helplessness is not recognized as a discrete mental illness, it 
would likely not qualify as an extraordinary circumstance 
excusing an untimely failure by itself.302 An applicant 
attempting to show extraordinary circumstances would 
probably still have to raise PTSD and/or MDD as the grounds 
for waiving the bar. However, learned helplessness is a 
pattern of behavior that results from, aggravates, and 
contributes to the formation of other mental illnesses. 
Though many learned helplessness effects are distinct from 
the symptoms of depressive and trauma-related disorders, 
learned helplessness is closely related to those disorders and 
could be raised in the same breath as a PTSD and/or MDD 
claim.  
The unique aspects of learned helplessness could be 
raised to bolster a claim that PTSD and/or MDD excused an 
untimely failure to file and also to help establish that PTSD 
and/or MDD was directly related to the untimely failure. Like 
the mental disorders raised as the extraordinary 
circumstances, the presence of learned helplessness would 
  
 302. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(5)(i) (2015). 
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need to be demonstrated by an expert witness.303 While 
certainly not all refugees develop learned helplessness, for 
those refugees who failed to apply within a year of arriving 
in the United States, especially those with PTSD and/or 
MDD, it does not appear that it would be difficult to make a 
strong case for the existence of learned helplessness effects.304 
Experimentally, the learned helplessness phenomenon is 
identified in humans through the presence of three criteria. 
First, the individual displays “inappropriate passivity” by 
“failing through lack of mental or behavioral action to meet 
the demands of a situation in which effective coping is 
possible.”305 Second, the learned helplessness effects are 
precipitated by “uncontrollable events.”306 Third, the effects 
are “mediated by particular cognitions acquired during 
exposure to uncontrollable events and inappropriately 
generalized to new situations.”307  
Applying these criteria to a refugee’s circumstances, an 
untimely failure itself demonstrates “inappropriate 
passivity.” The United States offers asylum openly during 
the first year of a refugee’s arrival in the United States and 
a failure to take advantage of this opportunity within that 
  
 303. See, e.g., Sabrineh Ardalan, Access to Justice for Asylum Seekers: 
Developing an Effective Model of Holistic Asylum Representation, 48 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 1001, 1022 (2015). 
 304. See Metin Basoglu et al., Torture vs Other Cruel, Inhuman, and Degrading 
Treatment: Is the Distinction Real or Apparent?, 64 ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 
277, 283 (2007). (“Humiliating treatment and attacks on personal integrity, 
cultural values, morals, or religious beliefs may induce feelings of helplessness in 
the individual through not being able to act on anger and hostility generated by 
such aversive treatment.”). Learned helplessness would be especially likely to 
develop when the persecution involves physical or psychological torture. See id. 
at 283-84; see also Mollica et al., Torture, supra note 172, at 543, 549-50 
(explaining that author’s study found “a higher prevalence of psychiatric 
symptomatology among the torture survivor group than the less traumatized 
comparison group,” which was consistent with other studies of torture survivors). 
 305. PETERSON, MAIER & SELIGMAN, supra note 278, at 228-29. 
 306. Id. at 229. 
 307. Id. This criterion refers generally to a belief that events are actually beyond 
control. Id. 
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time frame seems on its face to be inappropriate passivity.308 
This criteria could also be reinforced by other examples of 
similar passivity in a particular refugee’s life. Second, as 
discussed above, any refugee who had suffered past 
persecution would undoubtedly have also experienced 
“uncontrollable events” (“the infliction or threat of death, 
torture, or injury to one’s person or freedom” by the 
government, with its consent, or which the government is 
unable to stop).309 Finally, the very failure to apply for asylum 
would support an inference that the helplessness effects are 
generalized, extending to situations beyond the precipitating 
stimuli.310 The underlying cognitions would have to be 
determined on a case-by-case basis, but the existence of a 
diagnosable disorder in the form of depression or PTSD 
would go a long way towards that demonstration.311  
Individuals raising PTSD and MDD as an extraordinary 
circumstance also often admit to not knowing about the 
availability of asylum or not knowing how to go about 
obtaining it.312 Generally, lack of knowledge is not an 
  
 308. Cf. id. at 257 (“Thus, burnout involves maladaptive passivity. Those 
experiencing work-related exhaustion are rigid and do not seek solutions to their 
problems.”). Of course, this ignores other reasons for the passivity, including the 
avoidance symptoms of PTSD. However, human behavior can hardly be boiled 
down to single all-or-nothing causes or motivations, and this Comment does not 
propose the use of learned helplessness as a stand-alone ground for extraordinary 
circumstances. 
 309. See supra Part I.B.; cf. Susan J. Kelley, Learned Helplessness in the 
Sexually Abused Child, 9 ISSUES COMPREHENSIVE PEDIATRIC NURSING 193 (1986) 
(describing sexual abuse of children as an uncontrollable bad event). 
 310. Cf. DAVID C. GLASS & JEROME E. SINGER, URBAN STRESS: EXPERIMENTS ON 
NOISE AND SOCIAL STRESSORS 78, 85-86 (1972) (showing inability to control noise 
generalized to interfere with problem solving while identical noise, perceived as 
controllable, had no effect). 
 311. See PETERSON, MAIER & SELIGMAN, supra note 278, at 255 (“It is easier to 
argue for helpless cognitions on the part of Asian Americans. Sue (1997) reviews 
research showing that when compared with other (mostly white) Americans, 
Asian Americans report less autonomy and greater anxiety, nervousness, 
loneliness, alienation, and rejection.”). 
 312. See, e.g., Mlambo v. Att’y Gen., 297 F. App’x 198, 200 n.3 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(“The [immigration judge] also noted that Mlambo had stated at the asylum office 
that he delayed filing his application because he did not know the asylum process. 
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extraordinary circumstance.313 However, an individual 
experiencing the effects of learned helplessness could not be 
expected to proactively search for legal solutions to his or her 
problems. In this manner, learned helplessness could show 
that this lack of knowledge, being the result of a mental 
illness, is an “effect[ ] of persecution or violent harm suffered 
in the past.”314 This could provide additional support for 
PTSD or MDD as an extraordinary circumstance and 
illustrate how those conditions are directly related to a 
failure to timely file.  
Invoking learned helplessness as a way of explaining the 
effects of PTSD and/or MDD on an asylum applicant and, 
more importantly, how these effects are directly related to 
the applicant’s failure to timely file for asylum makes a more 
compelling case that an applicant’s PTSD and/or MDD 
qualifies as an extraordinary circumstance directly related to 
untimely asylum applications. Courts in different situations 
have already demonstrated that they are familiar and 
receptive to the theory of learned helplessness.315 Raising the 
concept of learned helplessness in adjudicatory proceedings 
could help bridge the gap between the experiences of refugees 




The [immigration judge] stated that such a lack of knowledge did not warrant a 
waiver of the filing deadline.”). 
 313. See, e.g., Bokhari v. Holder, 463 F. App’x 23, 24-25 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 314. 8 C.F.R. § 208.4(5)(i) (2015). 
 315. See supra Part IV.A. 
